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CHECKING THE PURSE: THE PRESIDENT’S 
LIMITED IMPOUNDMENT POWER 
CHRISTIAN I. BALE† 
ABSTRACT 
  The United States spends well over $700 billion annually on defense, 
more than the next ten countries combined and roughly half of the 
discretionary budget. The Department of Defense budget supports 
critical national security objectives, but even defense stalwarts 
acknowledge excessive spending, including unneeded military facilities, 
exponential cost overruns, outmoded weapons systems, and duplicative 
investments across the military services.  
  In the face of a congressional budget process distorted by special 
interest groups, this Note argues that the president possesses the 
constitutional authority to unilaterally curb some defense spending. In 
particular, the president may impound—refuse to spend money 
appropriated by Congress for government programs—in discrete areas 
of exclusive presidential authority and in three areas of shared 
responsibility with Congress: appropriations for weapons systems, 
military personnel, and military construction. To reach this conclusion, 
this Note analyzes historical practice dating back to President Thomas 
Jefferson to gloss the meaning of the Appropriations and Commander-
in-Chief Clauses as well as a recent Supreme Court decision that 
implicitly recognizes this constitutional authority.  
  Unlike prior impoundment scholarship, this Note does not argue for 
an unlimited national security impoundment power. In the past, 
government lawyers and scholars have invoked the Jefferson example 
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to support a broad claim to constitutional impoundment. Departing 
from that claim, this Note uncovers a historical account involving 
President James Madison previously not considered in impoundment 
scholarship. In short, Madison, an architect of the Constitution, 
afforded deference to Congress by carrying out a wasteful national 
security appropriation. 
  Impoundment may be a powerful tool for monitoring and cutting 
unnecessary defense spending, but the president’s constitutional 
authority to use it is not unrestricted. This Note develops a framework 
for a legitimate but limited presidential impoundment by accounting 
for Madisonian deference and by employing modern gloss analysis to 
discern impoundment’s boundaries. The Note concludes by applying 
this framework to unilateral actions taken by recent administrations 
and by assessing their constitutionality.  
INTRODUCTION 
During a 1973 news conference, President Richard Nixon stated 
he would “not spend money if the Congress overspends [nor support] 
programs that will raise the taxes and put a bigger burden on the 
already overburdened American taxpayer.”1 The president was 
referring to the practice of executive impoundment, whereby the 
administration withholds congressionally appropriated funding either 
permanently or by delaying funds.2 In the 1973 fiscal year alone, 
Nixon’s White House Office of Management and Budget (“OMB”) 
reported to Congress that it was impounding $7.7 billion.3 Two years 
earlier, OMB reported that the administration had impounded 
approximately $12.8 billion.4  
 
 1. G. CALVIN MACKENZIE, THE IMPERILED PRESIDENCY: LEADERSHIP CHALLENGES IN 
THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 117 (2017). 
 2. In modern legal terminology, canceling appropriated funds is referred to as “rescission,” 
whereas delaying funds past a congressionally mandated deadline is referred to as “deferral.” 
Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974, 2 U.S.C. §§ 683–684 (2018). Both 
actions are impoundments because they violate the statutory requirements in the appropriation 
law. Id.  
 3. Office of Management and Budget, Report Under Federal Impoundment and 
Information Act, 38 Fed. Reg. 19,584 (1973).  
 4. Impoundment of Appropriated Funds by the President: J. Hearing on S. 373 Before the 
Ad Hoc Subcomm. on Impoundment of Funds of the S. Comm. on Gov’t Operations & the 
Subcomm. on Separation of Powers of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong. 877–79 (1973) 
[hereinafter Impoundment Hearings]. 
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The president can exert control over government spending 
because executive branch agencies do not automatically have access to 
funding once Congress passes an appropriations law. For agencies to 
receive money to spend, OMB must first “apportion” funds to the 
agency.5 The apportionment process, which is technical and primarily 
conducted by civil servants,6 allows OMB to direct to an agency how 
much of its appropriation it may spend on specific projects, how much 
it may spend within a certain time period, or both.7 Apportionment 
enables OMB to exert quality control over executive branch spending.8 
It also ensures that agencies do not spend all of their appropriation 
funds too early in a fiscal year, in which case they might return to 
Congress to request more.9 Thus, apportionment provides the White 
House with a platform to interpose itself between Congress and 
executive agencies.  
To justify disobeying congressionally imposed spending levels and 
deadlines, Nixon claimed a “constitutional right for the President of 
the United States to impound funds.”10 Senior administration officials 
clarified that the president’s constitutional claim derived primarily 
from the Take Care Clause.11 They also cited historical practice. 
Deputy OMB Director Casper Weinberger defended the Republican 
administration by noting that Democratic Presidents Franklin 
Roosevelt, Harry Truman, and Lyndon Johnson each engaged in 
executive impoundment.12 Deputy Attorney General Joseph Sneed 
 
 5. See 31 U.S.C. §§ 1341–1342, 1349–1350, 1511–1519 (2018) (prohibiting agencies from 
making obligations or expenditures in excess of an apportionment).  
 6. See Eloise Pasachoff, The President’s Budget as a Source of Agency Policy Control, 125 
YALE L.J. 2182, 2229 & n.204 (2016) (noting that according to OMB career staffers, the 
apportionment process increased the power of civil servants (citing SHELLEY LYNNE TOMKIN, 
INSIDE OMB: POLITICS AND PROCESS IN THE PRESIDENT’S BUDGET OFFICE 188 (1998))). 
 7. 31 U.S.C. § 1512(b)(1).  
 8. See TOMKIN, supra note 6, at 187 (noting that OMB uses its “apportionment authorities 
as a tool to closely scrutinize agency expenditures and policies”); Pasachoff, supra note 6, at 2229 
(“The apportionment power gives OMB a regular opportunity to control how agencies conduct 
their operations.”).  
 9. Pasachoff, supra note 6, at 2228. 
 10. MACKENZIE, supra note 1. 
 11. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3 (stating that the president “shall take Care that the Laws be 
faithfully executed”).  
 12. Fund Impounding by Nixon Backed, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 25, 1971) [hereinafter Fund 
Impounding], https://www.nytimes.com/1971/03/25/archives/fund-impounding-by-nixon-backed-
budget-aide-tells-senators-that.html [https://perma.cc/BH4N-GTZE]. Weinberger, an attorney 
who would later serve for seven years as President Ronald Reagan’s secretary of defense, added 
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cited an even richer pedigree, noting that disallowing executive 
impoundment would “reverse 170 years of Presidential practice”13 and 
reduce the chief executive to “Chief Clerk.”14 Sneed was referencing 
the fact that executive impoundment was employed as early as Thomas 
Jefferson, the nation’s third president.15 Congress rejected Nixon’s 
constitutional arguments, instead rebuking the executive by passing 
the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974 
(“ICA”).16 The ICA allows the president to merely recommend 
rescinding funds by delivering a special message to Congress.17 
Congress thus recognized a statutory impoundment process but 
implicitly rejected executive impoundment by enacting a statute that 
purported to limit unilateral presidential action.18 
Nearly half a century after the passage of the ICA, impoundment 
has faded from legal scholarship.19 From a practical standpoint, 
statutory impoundment is an ineffective tool for controlling federal 
spending.20 With the exception of President Donald Trump, whose 
 
that the president’s role as commander-in-chief empowers him to impound military approprations. Id.; 
David Stout, Obituaries: Caspar W. Weinberger, Reagan’s Defense Chief, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 29, 2006), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2006/03/29/world/americas/29iht-web.0329caspar.html [https://perma.cc/
E6CW-J7GK].  
 13. Impoundment Hearings, supra note 4, at 369 (statement of Joseph T. Sneed, Deputy 
Att’y Gen. of the United States).  
 14. Id. at 363. Sneed also cited a functional rationale, noting that ending the practice would 
“undercut the President’s existing authority to combat inflation, unemployment and a wide range 
of economic ills.” Id.  
 15. LOUIS FISHER, PRESIDENTIAL SPENDING POWER 150 (1975) [hereinafter 
PRESIDENTIAL SPENDING POWER].  
 16. See Presidential Statement on Signing the Congressional Budget and Impoundment 
Control Act of 1974, 10 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 800 (July 12, 1974) [hereinafter Congress 
Passes ICA] (“The impoundment control provisions, in particular, may well limit the ability of 
the Federal Government to respond promptly and effectively to rapid changes in economic 
conditions.”). 
 17. See 2 U.S.C. § 683 (2018) (requiring the president in a special message to Congress to 
note “the amount of budget authority which he proposes to be rescinded” (emphasis added)).  
 18. This Note employs the terms “executive impoundment” and “statutory impoundment.” 
Executive impoundment refers to the president’s independent constitutional authority to 
impound. Statutory impoundment refers to impoundments made through the ICA framework. 
Unless otherwise specified, this Note will use the term “impoundment” to refer to executive 
impoundment.  
 19. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELS. L. OF THE U.S. § 1, reporters’ note 3 
(AM. L. INST. 1986) (“[T]he President’s claim of authority te [sic] impound funds appropriated by 
Congress apparently has been abandoned in the face of Congressional legislation denying such 
authority.”). 
 20. Neither President George W. Bush nor President Barack Obama sent Congress a formal 
statutory impoundment request. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., B-322906, UPDATED 
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OMB sent Congress a special message for a rescission request in 2018,21 
recent presidents have not employed statutory impoundment under 
the ICA.22  
Executive impoundment, however, may provide a mechanism for 
the president to monitor and sometimes reduce defense spending. By 
any measure, the United States spends a vast amount on national 
security appropriations. The president’s 2020 budget requested $718 
billion for the Department of Defense (“DoD”), a 5 percent increase 
over the 2019 enacted level.23 Whereas the other NATO countries 
spent an estimated 1.55 percent of GDP on defense spending in 2019, 
the United States spent 3.42 percent—which represents 70 percent of 
all NATO defense expenditures.24 In terms of total discretionary 
outlays, the United States spent $623 billion on defense in 2018, 
compared to $639 billion for all nondefense programs.25  
This Note contends that, notwithstanding executive 
impoundment’s dormancy, the president retains authority to impound 
funds in certain limited areas of foreign policy, primarily within the 
realm of national security. Part I asserts that, though the ICA and a 
subsequent Supreme Court decision26 closed the book on domestic 
impoundments, the Court has implicitly recognized that executive 
 
RESCISSION STATISTICS, FISCAL YEARS 1974–2011, at 1 (2012), https://www.gao.gov/assets/600/
592874.pdf [https://perma.cc/N6EH-8PQ8]. 
 21. Russ Vought, The White House Announces Its Rescission Package, WHITE HOUSE (May 
8, 2018), https://www.whitehouse.gov/articles/white-house-announces-rescission-package [https:/
/perma.cc/H9S8-UWTG]. 
 22. OMB Deputy Director Russ Vought noted that the ICA rescission process “hasn’t been 
used in nearly two decades.” Id. Moreover, while the 2018 Rescission Package was passed by 
Congress and cancelled approximately $15 billion in budget authority, the Congressional Budget 
Office reported that the measure would likely save only $1 billion in actual outlays over a ten-
year period. CONG. BUDGET OFF., RE: H.R. 3, THE SPENDING CUTS TO EXPIRED AND 
UNNECESSARY PROGRAMS ACT, AS INTRODUCED ON MAY 9, 2018 (2018), https://
www.cbo.gov/system/files/115th-congress-2017-2018/costestimate/hr3mccarthyltr_2.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/2JSR-DB5R].  
 23. OFF. OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFF. OF THE PRESIDENT, BUDGET OF THE U.S. 
GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 2020, at 23 (2019), https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/
uploads/2019/03/budget-fy2020.pdf [https://perma.cc/R5UF-HGRF].  
 24. Press Release, NATO, Defense Expenditure of NATO Countries (2012–2019), at 7–8 
(June 25, 2019), https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2019_06/20190625_PR2019-
069-EN.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z9NY-S6Q8].  
 25. CONG. BUDGET OFF., THE FEDERAL BUDGET IN 2018: A CLOSER LOOK AT 
DISCRETIONARY SPENDING 1 (2019), https://www.cbo.gov/system/files/2019-06/55344-Discretionary.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/S7XV-2RFL].  
 26. Train v. City of New York, 420 U.S. 35, 41 (1975). 
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impoundment is constitutional when Congress appropriates in a 
manner that intrudes on the president’s recognition power.27 This Part 
then explains how historical gloss, a modality of constitutional 
interpretation that focuses on longstanding practice, supports 
recognition of executive impoundment in the foreign policy context.  
Part II next contends that a previous argument for a categorical 
national security impoundment power is overbroad from the 
perspective of modern gloss analysis.28 Part III contributes to 
impoundment scholarship by applying modern gloss analysis to the 
Appropriations and Commander-in-Chief Clauses in order to discern 
the boundaries of executive impoundment. Using gloss analysis, this 
Note develops an analytical framework to evaluate the 
constitutionality of certain presidential actions, arguing that there is 
executive impoundment authority for appropriations related to 
weapons systems, military personnel, and military construction. Part 
IV concludes by applying this framework to unilateral actions taken by 
recent administrations and assesses their constitutionality.  
I.  BACKGROUND 
Executive impoundment began in the early Republic and 
continued well into the Nixon administration, when the Supreme Court 
rebuked the president for impounding funds allocated to a domestic 
policy program. This opinion, however, did not foreclose the possibility 
of impoundments in the foreign policy context, an inference supported 
by a more recent Supreme Court decision that implicitly recognized the 
constitutionality of an impoundment power in certain circumstances. 
Applying historical gloss, a modality of constitutional interpretation, 
establishes the contours of the president’s independent constitutional 
authority to impound in the realm of national security. 
 
 27. See Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Kerry (Zivotofsky II), 135 S. Ct. 2076, 2094–95 (2015) 
(recognizing that the Reception Clause provides the president with exclusive authority to 
determine the sovereign status of foreign countries, regardless of congressional intent); infra 
notes 77–90 and accompanying text. 
 28. See infra Part III discussing Roy Brownell’s scholarship. This contention is bolstered by 
an historical account involving President James Madison, not previously included in 
impoundment scholarship, which disrupts the narrative of an unbroken tradition of executive 
impoundment dating back to Jefferson.  
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A. Executive Impoundment from Jefferson Through Nixon 
Article I, § 9 of the Constitution provides that “[n]o Money shall 
be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations 
made by Law.”29 The Appropriations Clause reflects the Framers’ 
concern that the president would have monarchical power if he could 
spend more than authorized by Congress.30 Some Founders believed 
that Congress might be required to appropriate sufficiently to allow 
presidents to carry out their constitutional duties under Article II, but 
there was otherwise a Founding Era consensus that the Appropriations 
Clause was a “powerful instrument,” allowing Congress to set a ceiling 
on government spending.31  
Less clear was whether Congress could set a floor. Article I, § 9 
provides no textual guidance to answer this question. Nor is there any 
record of debate from the Constitutional Convention addressing the 
Appropriation Clause.32 Other spending provisions such as the 
Origination Clause and Raise and Support Clause did receive 
considerable attention—as did the two-year limit on army 
appropriations at ratification.33 Years after ratification, Alexander 
Hamilton spoke to the design of the Appropriations Clause, focusing 
on the imperative that an appropriation law precede an executive 
branch expenditure.34  
 
 29. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 7.  
 30. Madison stated that:  
Those who are to conduct a war cannot in the nature of things, be proper or safe judges 
of whether a war ought to be commenced, continued, or concluded. They are barred 
from the latter functions by a great principle in free government, analogous to that 
which separates the sword from the purse, or the power of executing from the power 
of enacting laws. 
6 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 148 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1906). Constitutional delegate 
George Mason likewise stated that the “purse & the sword ought never to get into the same hands 
(whether legislative or executive).” 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 
139–40 (Max Farrand ed., Yale Univ. Press 1911). 
 31. Kate Stith, Appropriations Clause, NAT’L CONST. CTR., https://www.constitutioncenter.org/ 
interactive-constitution/interpretation/article-i/clauses/756 [https://perma.cc/V8LS-CTPV]; see 
THE FEDERALIST NO. 58, at 359 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (“This power over 
the purse may, in fact, be regarded as the most complete and effectual weapon with which any 
constitution can arm the immediate representatives of the people, for obtaining a redress of every 
grievance, and for carrying into effect every just and salutary measure.”). 
 32. WILLIAM C. BANKS & PETER RAVEN-HANSEN, NATIONAL SECURITY LAW AND THE 
POWER OF THE PURSE 29 (1994).  
 33. See id. at 28–29 (describing rigorous debate at the Constitutional Convention 
surrounding specific terms of these spending provisions). 
 34. Hamilton wrote: 
BALE IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 11/16/2020  7:38 PM 
614  DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 70:607 
Hamilton’s conception of the federal Appropriations Clause 
tracks the historical practice in Great Britain and the American 
colonies. Though the power of Parliament “ebbed and flowed,” dating 
as far back as the thirteenth century, the House of Commons asserted 
the right to specify the uses for revenues.35 The colonial legislatures, for 
their part, asserted control over their militaries by enacting detailed 
appropriations.36 In fact, by the mid-eighteenth century, the colonial 
legislatures’ power of the purse was stronger than that of the House of 
Commons.37  
The lack of relevant debate at the Convention, coupled with 
English and colonial historical practice, suggests that the Framers 
included the Appropriations Clause to allow Congress control over the 
president by predicating executive access to resources on legislative 
approval. This inference is bolstered by the two-year constitutional 
limit on army appropriations, which ensures that Congress interstitially 
fund the military, rather than grant broad deference to the president 
through multi-year or even permanent appropriations.38 The inference, 
however, does not clarify whether the Appropriations Clause itself 
mandates that appropriations laws impose spending floors. 
The Constitution’s structure and early post-ratification history are 
likewise inconclusive. One scholar has noted that the placement of the 
Appropriations Clause in § 9 rather than § 8—which lists Congress’s 
 
The design of the constitution in this provision was as I conceive to secure these 
important ends—that the purpose the limit and the fund of every expenditure should 
be ascertained by a previous law. The public security is complete in this particular if no 
money can be expended but for an object, to an extent, and out of a fund, which the laws 
have prescribed. 
Alexander Hamilton, Explanation. By Mr. Hamilton on the Subject of a Late Attack Upon the 
President of the United States, and the Former and Present Secretary of the Treasury, in Relation 
to the Compensation of the President, DAILY ADVERTISER, Nov. 20, 1795, at supp., https://
founders.archives.gov/documents/Hamilton/01-19-02-0077#ARHN-01-19-02-0077-fn-0001 
[https://perma.cc/XE9G-PSFT].  
 35. BANKS & RAVEN-HANSEN, supra note 32, at 11–12. 
 36. Id. at 20–21 (“The colonial assemblies effectively usurped the governors’ military powers 
by specifying the purposes for which military appropriations could be spent, including the 
number, distribution, organization, pay, place and period of service, and supply of the officers and 
men to be raised.”). 
 37. Id. at 21.  
 38. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 26, supra note 31, at 171 (Alexander Hamilton) (“The 
legislature of the United States will be obliged by this provision, once at least in every two years, 
to deliberate upon the propriety of keeping a military force on foot; to come to a new resolution 
on the point; and to declare their sense of the matter by a formal vote in the face of their 
constituents.”).  
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enumerated powers—“supports the understanding that it is not a grant 
of affirmative power . . . but is, rather, a condition or limitation on the 
exercise of legislative power.”39 Additionally, after ratification, the 
Founders were split on how much flexibility the president should have 
in executing the federal budget. Whereas Hamilton and the Federalists 
favored broad appropriation bills lacking specific line-items, known as 
“lump-sum appropriation[s],” Jeffersonian Republicans favored 
legislative control and line-itemization.40 The nation’s first three 
appropriation bills—passed in 1789, 1790, and 1791—granted broad 
administrative flexibility.41 
The first clear instance of executive impoundment dates to the 
Jefferson administration’s impoundment of national security 
appropriations.42 In 1803, when France refused the United States 
access to the Port of New Orleans, Congress appropriated funding for 
fifteen gunboats.43 The Jefferson administration refused to spend the 
money out of fear that the purchases would jeopardize secret talks 
between Napoleon and Secretary of State James Madison, who were 
attempting to resolve the conflict.44 In his third annual message to 
Congress, Jefferson announced that a “favorable and peaceable turn 
of affairs on the Mississippi rendered an immediate execution of that 
law unnecessary.”45  
 
 39. Kate Stith, Congress’ Power of the Purse, 97 YALE L.J. 1343, 1349–50 (1988) (emphasis 
added). Professor Kate Stith notes, however, that the Appropriations Clause can be viewed as a 
grant of power because of Congress’s ability to place conditions on spending. Id. at 1350. 
 40. PRESIDENTIAL SPENDING POWER, supra note 15, at 59–61. 
 41. JAMES P. PFIFFNER, THE PRESIDENT, THE BUDGET, AND CONGRESS: IMPOUNDMENT 
AND THE 1974 BUDGET ACT 10 (1979); see also PRESIDENTIAL SPENDING POWER, supra note 15, 
at 148 (“It has long been the practice of the executive branch to regard appropriations as 
permissive rather than mandatory. From the days of George Washington, then, impoundments 
occurred whenever expenditures fell short of appropriations.”).  
 42. PRESIDENTIAL SPENDING POWER, supra note 15, at 150. President George Washington 
may have effectively exercised executive impoundment because, during his presidency, Congress 
made “lump-sum” appropriations in the areas of defense and foreign policy. Id. at 148.  
 43. Id. at 150; Allan L. Damon, Impoundment, 25 AM. HERITAGE 1, 1 (1973), https://
www.americanheritage.com/impoundment [https://perma.cc/ZY5X-ZNWW].  
 44. Damon, supra note 43, at 1.  
 45. Thomas Jefferson, Third Annual Message to Congress (Oct. 17, 1803), https://
avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/jeffmes3.asp [https://perma.cc/EF2G-7RJJ]; Damon, supra 
note 43, at 2. The “peaceable turn of affairs” was the Louisiana Purchase. PRESIDENTIAL 
SPENDING POWER, supra note 15, at 150. A year later, Jefferson announced to Congress that the 
money was being spent to obtain the gunboats. Id. Thus, Jefferson deferred the funding, rather 
than rescinding it.  
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There were few documented instances of executive impoundment 
in the nineteenth century,46 but this can partly be explained by the 
executive branch simply transferring money from one appropriation to 
another.47 Throughout that century, Congress intermittently enacted 
and repealed laws granting agencies transfer authority.48 Against the 
backdrop of a fluctuating legal scheme, agencies sometimes engaged in 
transfers absent statutory authority.49 Yet there are documented 
examples of impoundments during this period.50 Presidents James 
Buchanan and Ulysses S. Grant were among the nineteenth century 
presidents who impounded funds, and they did so in a domestic policy 
context.51 In 1860, President Buchanan impounded funds appropriated 
for Illinois post offices to punish the representatives of the state.52 In 
1876, President Grant impounded part of an appropriation bill for river 
and harbor improvements.53 
As the Appendix shows, executive impoundment continued into 
the twentieth century, primarily in connection with national security 
spending rather than domestic policy programs until the Johnson 
administration.54 The legal boundaries of impoundment, however, 
were not precisely defined, as disputes over impoundment were 
conducted via political negotiations rather than legal challenges. In 
general, Congress either acquiesced to the impoundment, or placed 
 
 46. See Nile Stanton, History and Practice of Executive Impoundment of Appropriated 
Funds, 53 NEB. L. REV. 1, 5 (1974) (“Every President from George Washington to Richard Nixon 
has almost certainly impounded appropriated funds.”).  
 47. See PRESIDENTIAL SPENDING POWER, supra note 15, at 101–04 (“Illegal transfers were 
not a simple matter of executive officials flouting the law. Congress itself contributed to the 
problem by failing to appropriate on time.”). 
 48. Id.  
 49. Id. at 102–04. For analysis of a modern, likely illegal transfer, see infra notes 253–68 and 
accompanying text. 
 50. See infra app. 
 51. LOUIS FISHER, THE CONSTITUTION BETWEEN FRIENDS: CONGRESS, THE PRESIDENT, 
AND THE LAW 91 (1978) [hereinafter THE CONSTITUTION BETWEEN FRIENDS]; see infra app. 
 52. THE CONSTITUTION BETWEEN FRIENDS, supra note 51, at 91.  
 53. Note, Impoundment of Funds, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1505, 1510 (1973) [hereinafter Harvard 
Note].  
 54. See Roy E. Brownell II, The Constitutional Status of the President’s Impoundment of 
National Security Funds, 12 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 1, 22 (2001) (“Before the 1970s, the 
majority of unauthorized impoundments occurred within the realm of national security affairs.”); 
infra app. 
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pressure on the president, causing him to disburse the funds.55 The 
constitutional discourse between the two branches dramatically 
escalated during the Nixon years.  
The Nixon administration argued that the president had authority 
to impound, grounding its argument in an interpretation of the Take 
Care Clause and historical practice.56 In his testimony before the 
Senate Subcommittee on Separation of Powers, Deputy OMB Director 
Casper Weinberger characterized an appropriations act as “a direction 
to be followed whenever it’s possible to do so,” but maintained that the 
Take Care Clause might require the president to withhold funding in 
certain contexts for good government purposes.57 In this instance, 
Weinberger defended Nixon’s impoundments as a means to control 
federal spending and reduce inflation.58  
Deputy Attorney General Joseph Sneed provided a second Take 
Care Clause-based rationale for the president’s “implied constitutional 
right” to impound.59 Sneed testified that the president is bound to 
enforce all laws, and executive impoundment is sometimes necessary if 
the executive is confronted with conflicting statutory demands.60 Thus, 
according to Sneed, an appropriation does not take precedence over 
other laws. Coupling the Take Care Clause reasoning with the 
longstanding executive branch practice of executive impoundment, 
Sneed concluded that the use of executive impoundment “to promote 
fiscal stability is not usurpation; rather it is in the great tradition of 
checks and balances upon which our Constitution is based.”61 
However, not every executive branch lawyer viewed the 
president’s conduct as legitimate. During his tenure as Nixon’s 
Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Office of Legal Counsel 
(“OLC”), William Rehnquist penned a memorandum to OMB 
asserting that executive impoundment was generally 
 
 55. Wm. Bradford Middlekauff, Twisting the President’s Arm: The Impoundment Control 
Act as a Tool for Enforcing the Principle of Appropriation Expenditure, 100 YALE L.J. 209, 211–
12 (1990). 
 56. Supra notes 11–13 and accompanying text. 
 57. Fund Impounding, supra note 12.  
 58. Id. 
 59. Impoundment Hearings, supra note 4, at 1092.  
 60. Id. at 1099 (referencing laws requiring the president to control the economy, including 
the Antideficiency Act of 1884 and the Employment Act of 1946). 
 61. Id. at 369 (statement of Joseph T. Sneed, Deputy Att’y Gen. of the United States). 
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unconstitutional.62 Rehnquist, however, suggested that two exceptions 
might exist. He wrote:  
Of course, if a Congressional directive to spend were to interfere with 
the President’s authority in an area confided by the Constitution to 
his substantive direction and control, such as his authority as 
Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces and his authority over 
foreign affairs . . . a situation would be presented very different from 
[a domestic impoundment].63 
Four years after Rehnquist’s memorandum, Congress passed the 
ICA.64 Critically, the ICA was a congressional reaction to Nixon’s 
executive impoundments of domestic appropriations. In 1973, Nixon 
slashed billions of dollars in domestic areas such as federal housing, 
highway safety, and environmental protection.65 No other president 
had impounded to such an extent in the domestic policy domain.66 
Congress therefore passed the ICA in response to a president using 
executive impoundment to obstruct Congress’s role in domestic 
policymaking, a usage that was incongruent with past practice in kind 
and scope.67  
A year after the ICA’s passage, the administration failed to adhere 
to the new statutory procedure.68 Under the Clean Water Act, 
Congress had allocated funding to help states and localities control 
water pollution—Nixon refused to spend the entire appropriation.69 In 
Train v. City of New York,70 the city of New York and other New York 
municipalities brought suit seeking their full allotment of funding.71 
 
 62. 116 CONG. REC. 343–45 (1970). 
 63. Id. at 345.  
 64. See Congress Passes ICA, supra note 16, at 800 (stating that the bill was signed in 1974).  
 65. See supra Introduction (noting, for example, that OMB reported approximately $12.8 
billion in impoundments in 1971). 
 66. See LOUIS FISHER, CONGRESSIONAL ABDICATION ON WAR AND SPENDING 118 (2000) 
(“Never before had congressional priorities and prerogatives been so altered and jeopardized.”). 
This may in part be attributed to the fact that the New Deal dramatically increased domestic 
spending and Nixon was only the second post-New Deal Republican president to hold office.  
 67. See Brownell, supra note 54, at 48 (“In response to President Nixon’s actions, Congress 
passed the ICA, an act which comprehensively restructured the federal budget process.”).  
 68. See Train v. City of New York, 420 U.S. 35, 41–49 (1975) (explaining the Clean Water 
Act’s Harsha amendments, which related to allocations of funds to states by the EPA 
administrator). 
 69. See id. at 35 (noting the availability of federal funds for sewers and waste treatment).  
 70. Train v. City of New York, 420 U.S. 35 (1975).  
 71. Id. at 40. 
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The Supreme Court ordered the president to disburse the funds but did 
not address the president’s constitutional claim of executive 
impoundment authority. Rather, the Court stated that “[t]he sole issue 
before us is whether the 1972 Act permits the [EPA] Administrator to 
allot to the States . . . less than the entire amounts authorized to be 
appropriated . . . .”72 The opinion did not use the terms “Constitution” 
or “separation of powers.” Instead, the Court’s focus on statutory 
interpretation suggests that it sought to avoid ruling directly on the 
question of executive impoundment—which would have closed the 
door to all forms of executive impoundment and end the political 
branches’ coordinate construction––and instead ruled solely on the 
basis of the text of a domestic policy statute.73 Similar to Congress’s 
passage of the ICA in response to a domestic impoundment, the 
impoundment the Court ruled on in Train was a domestic one. Thus, 
the Court’s ruling may have been prompted by an understanding that 
the Nixon administration had pushed the boundaries of impoundment 
too far. The Court’s decision to focus on statutory interpretation, 
rather than issue a constitutional holding, might have been an attempt 
to reconcile the tension between curbing Nixon’s actions with the 
historical pedigree of executive impoundment, especially in the foreign 
policy sphere. 
Thus, though Congress and the Court may have settled the issue 
of domestic impoundment, the Court did not necessarily foreclose 
impoundments relating to foreign affairs.74 And according to then-
 
 72. Id. at 41.  
 73. Train did not mark the Court’s only intervention in the context of impoundment. In 
Kendall v. United States ex rel. Stokes, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 524 (1838), the Supreme Court ordered 
the postmaster general to perform his “purely ministerial” duty to pay a contract claim as required 
by Congress. Id. at 613. Scholars, however, read this decision narrowly as only applying to the 
payment of claims for services pursuant to a ministerial duty. See, e.g., Louis 
Fisher, Funds Impounded by the President: The Constitutional Issue, 38 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 124, 
127 (1969) [hereinafter Funds Impounded by the President] (explaining a narrow reading that 
makes the case “only remotely relevant” to impoundment); Stanton, supra note 46, at 5 (arguing 
Kendall does not indicate “a lack of presidential control over appropriated funds”). 
 74. Brownell writes:  
While the Court ruled that the President was required to release the funds earmarked 
for a domestic program, the Court did not specifically comment on the constitutional 
issue of impoundment . . . . It is also important to note that the decision in no way 
involved the President impounding national security funds. 
Brownell, supra note 54, at 49–50; see also Roy E. Brownell II, Comment, The Unnecessary 
Demise of the Line Item Veto Act: The Clinton Administration’s Costly Failure To Seek 
Acknowledgment of “National Security Rescission,” 47 AM. U. L. REV. 1273, 1276–77 (1998) 
[hereinafter Brownell, Comment] (arguing that had the Clinton administration restricted its use 
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Assistant Attorney General Rehnquist, the Court may have lacked a 
constitutional basis to completely foreclose executive impoundments. 
If this is the case, the ICA’s relationship to the president’s 
constitutional authority to impound certain foreign policy 
appropriations can be analogized to how some scholars conceptualize 
the War Powers Resolution’s (“WPR”) relationship to the president’s 
authority as commander-in-chief. Among other things, the WPR 
requires the president to withdraw armed forces from a hostility within 
ninety days absent congressional approval.75 Some scholars assert that 
the president may disregard this provision because it impinges on the 
commander-in-chief authority, pointing to, for instance, when 
President Clinton exceeded the WPR time limit to withdraw.76 
Similarly, the ICA would be inapplicable to the president in the context 
of a foreign policy appropriation when he exercises the impoundment 
power pursuant to his constitutional authority.  
B. The Supreme Court’s Implicit Recognition of Executive 
Impoundment  
Rehnquist’s speculation was answered by the Supreme Court 
decades later in Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Kerry (“Zivotofsky 
II”).77 In that case, the Court held that the Reception Clause provided 
the president with exclusive authority to determine the sovereign status 
of foreign countries.78 As a general rule, the Court employs Justice 
Robert Jackson’s famous concurrence in Youngstown Sheet & Tube 
Co. v. Sawyer (The Steel Seizure Case)79 to assess the president’s 
constitutional authority to fly in the teeth of a congressional directive.80 
Jackson’s concurrence reasoned that the president’s power is at his 
“lowest ebb” when he acts in contravention of the express will of 
Congress.81 Despite this general rule, however, Zivotofsky II explicitly 
 
of cancellations under the Line Item Veto Act to national security provisions, the Court may have 
upheld the act).  
 75. War Powers Resolution of 1973, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541–1548 (2018).  
 76. David J. Barron & Martin S. Lederman, The Commander in Chief at the Lowest Ebb—
A Constitutional History, 121 HARV. L. REV. 941, 1070–71, 1090 (2008). 
 77. Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Kerry (Zivotofsky II), 135 S. Ct. 2076 (2015). For further 
discussion of this case, see infra Part III.C.  
 78. Zivotofsky II, 135 S. Ct. at 2094–95. 
 79. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (The Steel Seizure Case), 343 U.S. 579 (1952). 
 80. Id. at 634–60 (Jackson, J., concurring).  
 81. Id. at 637–38. 
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recognized an exclusive area of presidential power in the field of 
foreign policy, regardless of it contravening congressional intent.  
Although the case did not involve impoundment, the majority 
opinion was grounded in part in historical practice.82 One historical 
episode referenced by the Court implicitly recognized impoundment. 
The Court wrote that “[i]n 1818, Speaker of the House Henry Clay 
announced he ‘intended moving the recognition of Buenos Ayres and 
probably of Chile’” by passing an appropriation to fund the salary of a 
minister to Argentina.83 Clay’s plan was defeated because “Congress 
agreed the recognition power rested solely with the President.”84 Based 
on the Court’s reasoning, if Congress passed such an appropriation, the 
president could have refused to spend the funds. Yet had Clay 
succeeded in passing the 1818 appropriation, the law would not 
necessarily have been unconstitutional. Rather, the president could 
decide to recognize the sovereignty of Chile and subsequently expend 
the funds. Thus, the decision whether to execute the appropriation 
turned on the president’s discretion, affording him an impoundment 
power.85  
If the president may impound appropriations that invade his 
recognition power, it follows that he may likewise do so when Congress 
infringes on other exclusive powers, such as that of chief diplomat.86 
Although the Court has not explicitly recognized a chief diplomat 
 
 82. See Zivotofsky II, 135 S. Ct. at 2091 (acknowledging that the historical practice was “not 
all on one side, but on balance it provide[d] strong support for the conclusion that the recognition 
power is the President’s alone”). 
 83. Id. at 2092 (quoting JULIUS GOEBEL, THE RECOGNITION POLICY OF THE UNITED 
STATES 121 (1915)). 
 84. Id. 
 85. There are some hypothetical situations in which the president would or could not execute 
an appropriation because he would seemingly lack any incentive to do so, or because the conduct 
would be unconstitutional. See David J. Barron & Martin S. Lederman, The Commander in Chief 
at the Lowest Ebb—Framing the Problem, Doctrine, and Original Understanding, 121 HARV. L. 
REV. 689, 739 (2008) (“[T]here is no obvious reason to think Congress can use its spending powers 
to . . . violate the First Amendment, the Bill of Attainder Clause, or the Due Process 
Clause, . . . or to prohibit the President from issuing a particular pardon.” (footnote omitted)). 
Because the president has no real choice but to refuse to spend such an appropriation, none of 
these situations would afford him impoundment power. 
 86. See Saikrishna B. Prakash & Michael D. Ramsey, The Executive Power over Foreign 
Affairs, 111 YALE L.J. 231, 296 (2001) (“Washington, as America’s chief diplomat, understood 
that he possessed broad powers over foreign affairs.”). For a critique of Professors Saikrishna 
Prakash and Michael Ramsey’s claim that the president possesses a residual foreign affairs power, 
see Louis Fisher, Presidential Residual Power in Foreign Affairs, 47 CAP. U. L. REV. 491, 495–99 
(2019). 
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power, some scholars maintain that the president has the sole authority 
to lead treaty negotiations with foreign countries87 and to keep state 
secrets from Congress that pertain to diplomatic negotiations.88 
Similarly, the impoundment power may extend to the president’s core 
and exclusive powers as commander-in-chief. The extent to which the 
president has exclusive constitutional authority as commander-in-chief 
is a matter of intense debate both in and outside the academy.89 There 
is agreement, however, that at the core of the Commander-in-Chief 
Clause is the president’s authority to make operational decisions 
related to the command structure of the armed forces, within the scope 
of a congressionally authorized conflict.90 For example, although 
Congress may authorize or control the scope of a conflict, the 
legislature cannot dictate tactical military decisions against the 
president’s will.91 Therefore, if Congress appropriated $500 million to 
require the president to send the Army’s Tenth Mountain Division into 
an ongoing conflict, then, extending the logic of Zivotofsky II, the 
president would be on strong constitutional grounds to impound the 
appropriation.  
C. Examining the Scope of the Executive Impoundment Power 
Through Gloss Analysis 
Having established that executive impoundment is not 
unconstitutional in all applications within foreign policy, this Section 
sets the stage for discerning the scope of the president’s impoundment 
authority by applying gloss analysis to the Appropriations and 
 
 87. See 74 AM. JUR. 2d Treaties § 6 (2020) (“Under the Federal Constitution, the power to 
negotiate treaties is vested in the President. Congress is powerless to invade the field of 
international negotiations. However, while the President alone has the authority to negotiate and 
ratify treaties, he or she cannot act unilaterally.”); H. JEFFERSON POWELL, THE PRESIDENT’S 
AUTHORITY OVER FOREIGN AFFAIRS: AN ESSAY IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 153 
(2002) [hereinafter POWELL, FOREIGN AFFAIRS] (“The president has plenary and exclusive 
control over negotiation with foreign nations and other entities . . . .”). 
 88. See POWELL, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, supra note 87, at 153 (“The executive first asserted the 
power to control the release of diplomatic information and state secrets . . . during the 
Washington administration.”).  
 89. H. JEFFERSON POWELL, THE PRESIDENT AS COMMANDER IN CHIEF: AN ESSAY IN 
CONSTITUTIONAL VISION 3 (2014) [hereinafter POWELL, COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF POWER].  
 90. See id. at 121 (“A statute that simply transferred the entire power of command from the 
president to another officer would clearly be unconstitutional, and [Justice] Jackson clearly 
thought that the president would be entitled under the bottom tier analysis to disregard a statute 
that purported to break the chain of command . . . .”). 
 91. Id. at 121–22. 
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Commander-in-Chief Clauses. Although the previous Section 
addressed impoundments within the exclusive zone of presidential 
power, this Section asserts that historical gloss helps resolve the scope 
of the executive impoundment power across national security policy 
more generally—a policy realm that is concurrently shared with 
Congress. Part II reviews and critiques another scholar’s application of 
historical practice to support his argument for a broad impoundment 
power. Part III then applies modern gloss analysis to discern the 
contours of the president’s limited executive impoundment power. 
To clarify the meaning of an ambiguous constitutional provision, 
legal scholars, OLC, and the Supreme Court all frequently employ 
historical gloss as a modality of constitutional interpretation.92 Broadly 
defined, gloss posits that the longstanding historical practice of one 
branch of government combined with “institutional acquiescence” by 
another implicated branch of government can clarify constitutional 
meaning.93 Institutional acquiescence does not take a particular form 
and can be hard to identify, but acquiescence may occur when a branch 
waives its institutional prerogative—for instance, if the legislature does 
not pass a law on a particular issue.94 In Supreme Court jurisprudence, 
historical gloss traces back to at least McCulloch v. Maryland95 and was 
explicitly articulated by Justice Felix Frankfurter in his concurrence in 
 
 92. Curtis A. Bradley & Trevor W. Morrison, Historical Gloss and the Separation of Powers, 
126 HARV. L. REV. 411, 413 (2012). 
 93. See id. at 412 (defining gloss in the article’s abstract). Some originalist scholars have used 
the term “liquidation” to describe a similar concept. See, e.g., William Baude, Constitutional 
Liquidation, 71 STAN. L. REV. 1, 1 (2019) (“James Madison wrote that the Constitution’s meaning 
could be ‘liquidated’ and settled by practice.”); Lawrence B. Solum, Originalism and 
Constitutional Construction, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 453, 469–72 (2013) (arguing textual 
“ambiguity can be liquidated by context”). Unlike gloss, the originalist theory of liquidation 
focuses primarily on early historical practice. Curtis A. Bradley & Neil S. Siegel, Historical Gloss, 
Madisonian Liquidation, and the Originalism Debate, 106 VA. L. REV. 1, 8 (2020). 
 94. Bradley & Morrison, supra note 92, at 412; see, e.g., NLRB v. Noel Canning, 573 U.S. 
513, 526 (2014) (reasoning that the longstanding practice of presidential recess appointments 
“suggests that the Senate and President have recognized that recess appointments can be both 
necessary and appropriate in certain circumstances”). In a rare example of direct evidence of an 
agreement, “Congress in the 1973 War Powers Resolution expressly agreed with the executive 
branch that the President had the constitutional authority to use military force in response to ‘a 
national emergency created by attack upon the United States.’” Bradley & Morrison, supra note 
92, at 433–34 (quoting 50 U.S.C. § 1541(c) (2018)). 
 95. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 401 (1819) (noting the constitutionality 
of Congress’s power to incorporate a bank “if not put at rest by the practice of the government, 
ought to receive a considerable impression from that practice”).  
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Youngstown.96 Justice Frankfurter reasoned that, “[i]t is an 
inadmissibly narrow conception of American constitutional law to 
confine it to the words of the Constitution and to disregard the gloss 
which life has written upon them.”97  
More recently, the Court applied gloss in Zivotofsky II, in which 
the Court reasoned that the executive branch had consistently 
exercised the recognition power, and “[f]or the most part, Congress has 
acquiesced” to the practice.98 The year before, the Court in NLRB v. 
Noel Canning99 used gloss to interpret the Constitution’s Recess 
Appointments Clause.100 In that case, the Court engaged in a thorough 
historical analysis of presidential appointments during intrasession 
Senate recesses.101 The Court noted that its own precedents “treated 
practice as an important interpretive factor even when the nature or 
 
 96. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (The Steel Seizure Case), 343 U.S. 579, 610 
(1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).  
 97. Id.  
 98. Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Kerry (Zivotofsky II), 135 S. Ct. 2076, 2091 (2015). In the 
October Term 2019 alone, the Court applied historical gloss in at least three cases. See Chiafalo 
v. Washington, 140 S. Ct. 2316, 2323, 2326 (2020) (holding that states may enforce their electors’ 
pledges in a presidential election and noting that, “[f]rom the first, States sent [electors] to the 
Electoral College—as today Washington does—to vote for pre-selected candidates, rather than 
to use their own judgment.”); Trump v. Mazars USA, LLP, 140 S. Ct. 2019, 2031 (2020) (noting 
that the “congressional power to obtain information [through subpoenas] is ‘broad’ and 
‘indispensable’” (quoting Watkins v. United States, 354 U. S. 178, 187, 215 (1957))); id. 
(acknowledging that “Congress and the Executive have . . . managed for over two centuries to 
resolve such disputes among themselves without the benefit of guidance from [the Supreme 
Court,]” and recognizing that “[s]uch longstanding practice . . . imposes on [the Court] a duty of 
care to ensure that [it does] not needlessly disturb ‘the compromises and working arrangements 
that [those] branches . . . have reached’” (fifth alteration in original) (quoting NLRB v. Noel 
Canning, 573 U.S. 513, 526 (2014))); Fin. Oversight & Mgmt. Bd. for P.R. v. Aurelius Inv., LLC, 
140 S. Ct. 1649, 1656, 1659 (2020) (holding that “the Appointments Clause restricts the 
appointment of all officers of the United States, including those who carry out their powers and 
duties in or in relation to Puerto Rico” and noting that, “[l]ongstanding practice indicates that a 
federal law’s creation of an office in [the context of Congress legislating for a non-state locality] 
does not automatically make its holder an ‘Officer of the United States’”). 
 99. NLRB v. Noel Canning, 573 U.S. 513 (2014). 
 100. See id. at 524 (“[I]n interpreting the Clause, we put significant weight upon historical 
practice.” (emphasis omitted)). The Court also noted:  
As James Madison wrote, it “was foreseen at the birth of the Constitution, that 
difficulties and differences of opinion might occasionally arise in expounding terms & 
phrases necessarily used in such a charter . . . and that it might require a regular course 
of practice to liquidate & settle the meaning of some of them.”  
Id. at 525.  
 101. See id. at 528–33 (reviewing U.S. history, particularly post-Civil War history, for 
examples of historical practice supporting the Court’s conclusion). 
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longevity of that practice is subject to dispute, and even when that 
practice began after the founding era.”102  
Professors Curtis Bradley and Trevor Morrison, observing the 
surprisingly limited scholarship on gloss, explain its significant role in 
resolving separation of powers disputes.103 Gloss is particularly useful 
for analyzing separation of powers contexts, such as executive 
impoundment, for both practical and normative reasons. For practical 
reasons, the Court intervenes less often in disputes involving the 
political branches.104 Therefore, the history of the interactions between 
the political branches may provide the best evidence of constitutional 
meaning.105 And on normative grounds, the political branches, which 
hold their own valid constitutional views, are sometimes better situated 
to develop constitutional law involving tensions between themselves. 
Through repeated interactions with each other, the political branches 
develop and sharpen their understanding of what the best meaning of 
a constitutional provision may be by repeated application to policy.106  
Executive impoundment in the area of foreign policy is ripe for 
historical gloss analysis. The Train Court may have avoided issuing a 
constitutional holding precisely because it recognized a series of 
complex interactions between the president and Congress in regard to 
impoundment. Additionally, the constitutional provisions at issue—the 
Appropriations107 and Commander-in-Chief Clauses108 and perhaps the 
Take Care Clause109—lack the textual precision and legislative history 
 
 102. Id. at 525. 
 103. Bradley & Morrison, supra note 92, at 413.  
 104. Id. at 456–57. 
 105. See Bradley & Siegel, supra note 93, at 31 (summarizing Justice Frankfurter’s definition 
of gloss in Youngstown as “the actions and interactions of federal government institutions over 
time can help resolve questions about the constitutional scope of their respective authority”). 
 106. See Bradley & Morrison, supra note 92, at 434–35 (describing two ways repeated 
interactions lead to constitutional understanding). Therefore, allowing Congress and the 
president their own space to discern constitutional meaning may be preferable to the Court’s 
intervention, which, due to stare decisis, can freeze constitutional understanding.  
 107. See supra notes 29–41 and accompanying text (noting the placement of the 
Appropriations Clause and the Founders’ views on presidential administration of the budget).  
 108. See infra note 162 and accompanying text (noting that the clause received almost no 
attention at the Constitutional Convention). 
 109. See Andrew Kent, Ethan J. Leib & Jed Handelsman Shugerman, Faithful Execution and 
Article II, 132 HARV. L. REV. 2111, 2114 (2019) (“Over the centuries, the two Faithful 
Execution Clauses have produced wide-ranging jurisprudences and have been marshaled in many 
constitutional debates.”). 
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to answer whether the president may impose a ceiling for certain 
foreign policy-related appropriations.  
The Court has not articulated a methodology for identifying gloss, 
but Bradley reasons that looking to the justifications for relying on 
historical practice is a useful starting point. There are at least four: (1) 
deference to nonjudicial actors; (2) limits on judicial capacity; (3) 
consequentialist concerns; and (4) reliance interests.110 These 
justifications can be employed as factors that support recognition of a 
gloss on constitutional provisions.  
The first factor embodies the notion of coordinate interpretation, 
which asserts that the political branches, like the judicial branch, are 
competent interpreters of the Constitution and may, in some cases, be 
more familiar than the Court with the consequences of an 
interpretation.111 The second factor recognizes that, in some cases, the 
Court may not have adequate tools to interpret the Constitution 
because of a lack of textual guidance or evidence of original meaning.112 
The third factor, consequentialism, is based on good government 
considerations.113 A deep-seated historical practice might indicate what 
has been demonstrated to work well and might also adapt to changing 
circumstances.114 Zivotofsky II relied on this factor because the Court 
emphasized the need for the American government to speak with one 
voice on the issue of recognition.115 The fourth factor incorporates both 
coordinate interpretation and consequentialist rationales. It states that, 
over a period of time, the political branches may have adjusted their 
behavior to account for time-honored practice and may have made 
subsequent decisions and concessions based on that practice.116  
In addition to these four factors, both institutional practice by one 
branch and acquiescence by the other must be shown to establish 
 
 110. See Curtis A. Bradley, Doing Gloss, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 59, 64–67 (2017) [hereinafter 
Doing Gloss] (explaining each of these four justifications). 
 111. Id. at 64–65.  
 112. See id. at 65–66 (noting that a lack of textual guidance is especially true of Article II 
powers). 
 113. See id. at 66 (“These practices reflect the judgments of many actors over time, informed 
by the realities of governance and changes in the needs of governance, and therefore . . . they 
have the potential to embody collective wisdom. Under this rationale, the very persistence of a 
practice is evidence of its utility.”). 
 114. Id. 
 115. Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Kerry (Zivotofsky II), 135 S. Ct. 2076, 2086 (2015).  
 116. Doing Gloss, supra note 110, at 67. 
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constitutional gloss.117 There is no clear standard for how long a 
practice must continue for it to become gloss.118 The acquiescence 
requirement comes directly from Frankfurter’s Youngstown 
concurrence.119 As the deference factor is focused upon intentionality, 
a heightened showing of acquiescence is necessary when basing gloss 
on that factor.120 When gloss is primarily anchored on one or more of 
the other three factors, which are functional and consequentialist, then 
a lesser showing of acquiescence may be sufficient.121  
II.  INSUFFICIENT HISTORICAL BASIS FOR A CATEGORICAL 
NATIONAL SECURITY IMPOUNDMENT POWER 
This Note is not the first piece of scholarship to apply historical 
gloss analysis to the issue of impoundment within the field of foreign 
policy. In 2001, scholar Roy Brownell argued for a broad national 
security impoundment power.122 Although Brownell’s article predates 
the modern intellectual framework for applying gloss, Brownell, like 
the Nixon administration, uses a similar analytical approach, basing his 
constitutional argument for impoundment in part on historical practice 
dating back to Jefferson.123 This Part asserts that Brownell’s claim is 
overbroad, pointing instead to evidence that President James Madison 
afforded Congress deference by carrying out a wasteful national 
security appropriation—a historical episode that Brownell overlooks. 
 
 117. Id. at 60. 
 118. Bradley notes that invoking gloss based on consequentialism and reliance requires longer 
historical practice, relatively, than gloss based on deference or lack of judicial capacity. Id. at 74. 
 119. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (The Steel Seizure Case), 343 U.S. 579, 
613 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (explaining that “long-continued acquiescence of 
Congress” can “giv[e] decisive weight to a construction by the Executive of its powers”). 
 120. See Doing Gloss, supra note 110, at 75 (“The justification that most closely depends on a 
showing of acquiescence is the deference justification.”). Zivotofsky II illustrates that a strong 
showing of acquiescence may not be necessary in all cases. Although the Court found that 
Congress had acquiesced to presidential control over the recognition power, that finding was 
disputed. See Curtis A. Bradley, Agora: Reflections on Zivotofsky v. Kerry: Historical Gloss, the 
Recognition Power, and Judicial Review, 109 AJIL UNBOUND 2, 2 (2015) (“In Zivotofsky II, the 
relevant practice provided clear support only for a power of recognition and was ambiguous about 
whether this power was concurrent or exclusive.”).  
 121. See Doing Gloss, supra note 110, at 76–77 (“In short, under many of the potential 
justifications for gloss, institutional acquiescence is less central than is commonly assumed.”). 
 122. See Brownell, supra note 54, at 11 (“At the core of the concept of National Security 
Impoundment is the notion that the President possesses greater constitutional authority in the 
field of national security affairs than in domestic affairs.”).  
 123. Id. at 30. 
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Additionally, this Part argues that Zivotofsky II rebuffs Brownell’s 
claim that the president has primacy over Congress in foreign policy. 
Accordingly, this Part asserts that a sound account of the president’s 
impoundment power must closely track historical practice rather than 
relying on a model of presidential supremacy. 
A. Brownell’s Account of a National Security Impoundment  
Brownell correctly observes that the 1801 Jefferson impoundment 
involved a national security issue, and that many of the recorded 
instances of impoundments also pertained to national security.124 
Brownell is thus the first scholar to argue that Train did not foreclose 
national security impoundments and does so based on two hundred 
years of executive branch practice. Although Brownell’s intellectual 
framework is factor based and does not give the president carte 
blanche to employ national security impoundments,125 his conception 
of a national security impoundment power is categorical in nature and 
far-reaching. For instance, he argues that “[d]uring World War II, 
President Roosevelt displayed the full measure of [his impoundment] 
discretion by impounding funds earmarked for a variety of 
infrastructure projects.”126 Brownell concedes that those 
impoundments, which totaled hundreds of millions of dollars, “on their 
face had little to do with military matters.”127 Nevertheless, he claims 
that when the nation is at war, the president possesses some authority 
to impound funds “deemed generally to be domestic in nature.”128  
A national security impoundment power, Brownell seems to 
argue, allows the president to cancel domestic appropriations when it 
relates to national security based on two claims. First, Jefferson’s 
impoundment marks the beginning of “a long and continuous [custom], 
thus affirming its status as constitutional.”129 This argument has 
additional significance, Brownell argues, because practices sanctioned 
by early administrations are given greater weight as they are suggestive 
of the Framers’ original intent.130 Second, and relatedly, Brownell 
 
 124. Id. at 32; see infra app. 
 125. Brownell, supra note 54, at 10–11 (listing five factors the president must meet). 
 126. Id. at 106. 
 127. Id.  
 128. Id. at 106–07. 
 129. Id. at 59. 
 130. POWELL, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, supra note 87, at 28. 
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contends that Congress is constitutionally less competent to legislate in 
the sphere of foreign policy than in domestic policy—what this Note 
terms a “primacy approach” to foreign policy legislation.131  
Yet Brownell’s analysis does not accurately describe the scope of 
executive impoundment. As an initial matter, it cannot be the case that 
the president can impound domestic appropriations simply because of 
national security concerns, as Brownell suggests that he can. On its 
face, the Roosevelt impoundment is nearly indistinguishable from 
Truman’s decision to nationalize the domestic steel mills to support the 
Korean War effort, which the Supreme Court in Youngstown held was 
unconstitutional.132 The next Section demonstrates that historical gloss 
cannot support a categorical national security impoundment for two 
additional reasons. First, this Note presents evidence that Madison was 
less certain than his predecessor was that the president has a 
prerogative to impound. And second, Zivotofsky II, though it 
established the exclusivity of the president’s recognition power, also 
contradicted the primacy approach to foreign policy legislation.  
B. James Madison Deferred to Congress Despite a Policy 
Disagreement  
Both Brownell and the Nixon administration referenced the 1801 
Jefferson impoundment to support the president’s claim to 
independent constitutional authority to engage in the practice.133 If 
Jefferson is the starting point, then a line of over 170 years of executive 
branch practice can be drawn from Jefferson to the Nixon 
administration. This Note, however, identifies a second early historical 
example, which shows that Jefferson’s immediate successor, Madison, 
conscientiously fulfilled the wishes Congress expressed in a defense 
appropriation.  
Jefferson had signed the Embargo Act of 1807, which established 
American neutrality during the Napoleonic Wars between Great 
 
 131. See Brownell, supra note 54, at 11–18 (“[T]he President possesses greater constitutional 
authority in the field of national security affairs than in domestic affairs.”). 
 132. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (The Steel Seizure Case), 343 U.S. 579, 637 
(1952) (Jackson, J., concurring) (“When the President takes measures incompatible with the 
expressed or implied will of Congress, his power is at its lowest ebb, for then he can rely only upon 
his own constitutional powers minus any constitutional powers of Congress over the matter.”). 
 133. See supra notes 13–15 and accompanying text. 
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Britain and France,134 and prohibited commerce with both of those 
countries.135 But the embargo increased hostilities with Great Britain, 
and in response, Congress enacted an appropriation to bolster the 
American Navy.136 By late 1809, however, tensions between the United 
States and Great Britain had momentarily settled, and the two 
countries anticipated reopening trade in 1810.137 Accordingly, Albert 
Gallatin, who served as secretary of the treasury to both Jefferson and 
Madison, was frustrated with the defense appropriation.138 In a May 
1809 letter to then-President Madison, Gallatin addressed the Navy 
appropriation:  
Will it not be proper to suggest a reduction, on the grounds both of 
cessation of the causes which produced the encrease, & of the state of 
the finances? The navy appropriation was near 3 millions of dollars—
the objects, enforcing embargo, employing seamen, protecting 
commerce—all now at an end—no utility whatever; & no expense less 
justifiable has ever been authorised since the commencemt. of this 
Government. All I ask however, is that Congress should repeal the 
absurd law forced by Giles & Smith on the house; so that the 
discretion should rest with the President to employ or not to employ 
the vessels & men; by which we would be enabled at once to get rid 
of that profligate excrescence. As to the army I feel less anxiety, 
because there may be some use for the men & because the expense 
there has always been kept within decent bounds. Yet the encrease is 
beyond our wants if we have no English war and of no use in case of 
French war.139 
The appropriations law Gallatin referenced called for promptly 
outfitting four frigates and stationing them “and other armed 
vessels . . . at such ports and places on the sea coast” as the president 
 
 134. Embargo of 1807, THOMAS JEFFERSON ENCYCLOPEDIA, https://www.monticello.org/
site/research-and-collections/embargo-1807 [https://perma.cc/X5NJ-VDDL].  
 135. Id. 
 136. Act of Nov. 24, 1807, ch. 1, § 1, 1 Stat. 450, 450; see Embargo of 1807, supra note 134 
(“Because the embargo had prompted an increase in smuggling, the enforcement act allowed port 
authorities to seize cargoes if there was any suspicion of violation of the embargo, and the 
President himself was empowered to use the Army or the Navy for additional enforcement.”). 
 137. Letter from Albert Gallatin, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, to President James 
Madison, (May 18, 1809), https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Madison/03-01-02-0218 
[https://perma.cc/GCF3-REXT]. 
 138. Id. 
 139. Id.  
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“may deem most expedient.”140 Five days later, Madison wrote to 
Congress, updating the legislature on the state of foreign affairs.141 
Madison wrote, “Of the additional Frigates required by an Act of the 
last Session, to be fitted for actual service, two are in readiness; one 
nearly so, and the fourth is expected to be ready, in the month of 
July.”142 He continued, “It will rest with the judgment of Congress to 
decide, how far the change in our external prospects, may authorize 
any modifications of the laws, relating to the Army and Navy 
establishments.”143 These two letters suggest that the president and his 
treasury secretary viewed the appropriation law as mandatory. 
Although the administration and Congress may have had differing 
opinions on financial priorities, the president deferred to Congress’s 
legislative mandate.144  
Scholars such as Brownell must somehow reconcile Jefferson’s 
impoundment with “Madisonian deference” to Congress. Jefferson’s 
actions show that he viewed expenditure of the funds as wasteful and 
believed that spending on the gunboats might unnecessarily anger 
France at a time when delicate negotiations were taking place between 
the two countries. The Madisonian example complicates the picture 
because the episode shares striking similarities with Jefferson’s 
impoundment. Both situations involved Congress appropriating for an 
anticipated armed conflict—the first with France, the second with 
Great Britain—and in both cases, the executive branch viewed the 
spending as wasteful given the softening of international relations. And 
finally, Gallatin served as treasury secretary to both presidents.145  
Madisonian deference shows that early in the Republic, presidents 
understood appropriations as not only ceilings for spending, but also as 
floors. That the Madison administration executed the appropriation 
anyway, despite viewing the frigates as wasteful, cuts against a 
categorical national security impoundment power. Madison’s conduct 
could possibly be viewed as showing deference to Congress in an area 
 
 140. Id.  
 141. Letter from President James Madison to Congress (May 23, 1809) [hereinafter 
Madison Letter], https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Madison/03-01-02-0227 [https://
perma.cc/Q3RH-BUYA]. 
 142. Id. (emphasis added).  
 143. Id. 
 144. What this Note will refer to as “Madisonian deference.” 
 145. Albert Gallatin (1801–1814), U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, https://home.treasury.gov/
about/history/prior-secretaries/albert-gallatin-1801-1814 [https://perma.cc/2XME-74ZQ]. 
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of shared responsibility, still leaving room for categorical national 
security impoundment authority. He did, for example, impound by 
reducing the crews of the New Orleans gunboats for economy.146 But 
his deference in the frigates example at least muddies the water. 
Although Jefferson impounded funds, the fourth president—an 
architect of the Constitution—deferred to Congress.  
C. The Court Rejected a Presidential Primacy Approach to Foreign 
Policy Legislation in Zivotofsky II 
In addition to failing to account for Madisonian deference, 
Brownell’s view of the president’s preeminence in the domain of 
foreign policy is overstated. His view was informed by the Supreme 
Court’s decision in United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.,147 
which is often cited by those favoring broad executive power in foreign 
policy.148 Curtiss-Wright involved a delegation of legislative power to 
Roosevelt to establish an arms embargo in South America. The Court 
upheld the delegation, noting “[t]hat there are differences between 
[the president’s control over internal and external affairs], and that 
these differences are fundamental, may not be doubted.”149 The Court 
further stated, in dicta, that “the President is the sole organ of the 
federal government in the field of international relations.”150 For nearly 
a century, scholars and executive branch lawyers invoked this 
erroneous dicta for the proposition that the president holds ultimate 
power in foreign affairs.151 
Yet Congress exerts considerable control over foreign policy, 
particularly regarding national security. The text of the Constitution 
provides Congress with the power to declare war, to fund armed 
 
 146. Madison Letter, supra note 141. 
 147. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936). 
 148. Michael J. Glennon, Recognizable Power: The Supreme Court Deals a Blow to Executive 
Authority, FOREIGN AFFS. (June 23, 2015), https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/
2015-06-23/recognizable-power [https://perma.cc/NZ9X-VJ4J].  
 149. Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 315.  
 150. Id. at 320. The phrase “sole organ” was first uttered by then-Congressman John Marshall. 
Id. at 319. 
 151. See Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Kerry (Zivotofsky II), 135 S. Ct. 2076, 2089 (2015) 
(“In support of his submission that the President has broad, undefined powers over foreign affairs, 
the Secretary quotes United States v. Curtiss–Wright Export Corp. . . .”); Louis Fisher, The Staying 
Power of Erroneous Dicta: From Curtiss-Wright to Zivotofsky, 31 CONST. COMMENT. 149, 154, 
211 (2016) (noting that “OLC, reporters, and others” cite Curtiss-Wright to support claims of the 
president’s foreign policy power). 
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conflicts, and to regulate the military.152 Congress may also oversee 
military conflicts and may have the power to declare that an armed 
conflict must come to an end.153  
Zivotofsky II was written in opposition to the Curtiss-Wright view, 
espoused by Brownell, that the president possesses special authority in 
foreign affairs relative to Congress. Although Zivotofsky II marked the 
first time that the Court struck down an act of Congress in the field of 
foreign affairs, the analysis the Court used understood that Congress 
was a substantial player in foreign policymaking. The Court reasoned 
that Congress may legislate on foreign affairs issues, as long as it does 
not do so in a way that interferes with a president’s exclusive power.154 
Justice Anthony Kennedy wrote, 
Curtiss-Wright did not hold that the President is free from Congress’ 
lawmaking power in the field of international relations . . . . In a 
world that is ever more compressed and interdependent, it is 
essential [that] the congressional role in foreign affairs be 
understood and respected. For it is Congress that makes laws, and 
in countless ways its laws will and should shape the Nation’s 
course. The Executive is not free from the ordinary controls and 
checks of Congress merely because foreign affairs are at 
issue . . . . It is not for the President alone to determine the whole 
content of the Nation’s foreign policy.155  
The dissenters, Chief Justice John Roberts, Justice Samuel Alito, 
and Justice Antonin Scalia, did not agree that the president’s 
recognition power was exclusive, arguing instead that it was a shared 
power with Congress.156 Like the majority, they also repudiated 
 
 152. Article I, § 8 vests Congress with substantive powers that pertain to national security, 
including to “provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of the United States,” “[t]o 
declare War,” “[t]o raise and support Armies,” “[t]o provide and maintain a Navy,” and “[t]o 
make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces.” U.S. CONST. art. 
I, § 8. These powers therefore afford Congress a shared role in national security policy.  
 153. See Barron & Lederman, supra note 76, at 946–50 (finding that “Congress has been an 
active participant in setting the terms of battle (and the conduct and organization of the armed 
forces and militia more generally)”); Leonard G. Ratner, The Coordinated Warmaking Power—
Legislative, Executive, and Judicial Tools, 44 S. CAL L. REV. 461, 470 (1971) (“Congress may 
terminate as well as authorize hostilities, i.e. declare peace as well as war.”); J. Gregory Sidak, To 
Declare War, 41 DUKE L.J. 27, 87 (1991) (discussing William Blackstone’s statement “that under 
English law,” the power to declare war implies the power to declare peace). 
 154. Zivotofsky II, 135 S. Ct. at 2090. 
 155. Id.  
 156. Id. at 2114 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
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Curtiss-Wright.157 Only Justice Clarence Thomas clung to a Curtiss-
Wright conception of presidential power in foreign policy.158 Therefore, 
eight Justices agreed that Congress has substantial legislative authority 
in the foreign policy sphere.  
Zivotofsky II thus rejected both the primacy approach and the 
erroneous dicta of Curtiss-Wright. In the words of Justice Kennedy, 
“[W]hether the realm is foreign or domestic, it is still the Legislative 
Branch, not the Executive Branch, that makes the law.”159 Accordingly, 
any account of historical gloss must accommodate the Court’s view that 
outside of discrete areas of exclusive presidential power, Congress is 
just as competent to legislate in foreign affairs as in domestic policy. 
Brownell’s expansive vision of a national security impoundment does 
not withstand a historical gloss analysis. His categorical approach not 
only fails to comport with Youngstown, but it also does not account for 
either Madisonian deference or the Supreme Court’s recent 
repudiation of the presidential primacy approach to foreign policy 
legislation. 
III.  GLOSS SUPPORTS A NARROW POWER TO IMPOUND 
APPROPRIATIONS FOR WEAPONS SYSTEMS, MILITARY PERSONNEL, 
AND MILITARY CONSTRUCTION 
Although there is not sufficient evidence for a categorical national 
security impoundment, historical practice does support discrete 
executive impoundment authorities within the field of national 
security. Critically, as discussed in detail above, the Appropriations 
Clause is silent as to whether Congress may impose a floor on 
government spending.160 Standing alone, the Appropriations Clause 
warrants consideration of longstanding historical practice to inform its 
meaning. Yet the Commander-in-Chief Clause is also ambiguous and 
may clarify the meaning of the Appropriations Clause in certain 
contexts. The former provides that “[t]he President shall be 
Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United 
 
 157. Id. at 2115. The majority did, however, bless Curtiss-Wright’s dicta that the president 
“has the sole power to negotiate treaties.” Id. at 2086 (citing United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. 
Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319 (1936)).  
 158. Id. at 2096–2113 (majority opinion). 
 159. Id. at 2090. 
 160. See supra notes 29–41 and accompanying text. 
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States . . . .”161 There is no additional text expounding the meaning of 
the Commander-in-Chief Clause, which received almost no attention 
at the Constitutional Convention.162 Thus, neither the text of the 
Constitution nor the Convention record speak to whether, and to what 
extent, the Commander-in-Chief Clause colors the meaning of the 
Appropriations Clause in the domain of national security 
appropriations.163  
Thus, only historical practice provides any additional clarification 
on how these constitutional provisions interact. This Part shows that 
repeated exchanges between the political branches regarding 
impoundments for weapon systems, military personnel, and military 
construction provide a gloss for the Appropriations and Commander-
in-Chief Clauses. The deep-seated historical practice and 
corresponding constitutional dialogue in these domains support the 
president’s authority to execute certain appropriations laws with 
discretion and sensitivity, based on his role as commander-in-chief.  
A. Repeated Exchanges Involving Weapons System, Military 
Personnel, and Military Construction Impoundments 
This Note argues against a categorical form of impoundment for 
national security, but many executive impoundments did occur in a 
 
 161. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1. 
 162. See POWELL, COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF POWER, supra note 89, at 98 (discussing the 
difficulty—or perhaps impossibility—of determining the precise meaning of the Commander-in-
Chief Clause by examining “the brief account in Madison’s notes of the Philadelphia framers’ 
discussion of war-making power”). 
 163. The Take Care Clause likewise lacks interpretive guidance. That clause, which states that 
the president “shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed,” U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3, is 
generally understood to either impose a responsibility or provide an affirmative grant of power. 
See Jack Goldsmith & John F. Manning, The Protean Take Care Clause, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 1835, 
1836 (2016) (“Through a long and varied course of interpretation, however, the Court has read 
that vague but modest language, in the alternative, either as a source of vast presidential power 
or as a sharp limitation on the powers of both the President and the other branches of 
government.”). The Nixon administration’s analysis focused on the Take Care Clause, asserting 
that the president could impound in any context because of his need to enforce laws with 
conflicting goals, such as implementing costly domestic government programs while enacting a 
mandate to combat inflation. See supra notes 11, 14 and accompanying text. Although the 
president may need a certain amount of discretion to enforce seemingly conflicting statutory 
directives, this Note avoids the Take Care Clause debate and primarily focuses on the 
Appropriations Clause and its interaction with the Commander-in-Chief Clause.  
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national security context.164 Repeated exchanges between the political 
branches suggest that the president may impound appropriations for 
weapons systems, and, to a lesser extent, appropriations increasing the 
number of military personnel and providing for military construction 
projects. Of the thirty-three documented instances of national security 
impoundments, as the Appendix illustrates, twenty involved weapons 
systems appropriations, six were for military personnel, and three 
involved military construction.165 Thus, the recurrence of weapons 
system, military personnel, and military construction impoundments 
(“WPC impoundments”) establishes discrete areas of executive branch 
practice.166  
Of all forms of impoundments, the strongest case for deep-rooted 
executive practice exists for weapons systems. The first weapon-system 
impoundment occurred when Jefferson delayed the gunboat 
appropriations. Though the next weapons impoundment did not occur 
until 1949, when Truman impounded funding to build the USS United 
States aircraft carrier,167 four subsequent presidents, from both political 
parties, impounded weapons systems over a twenty-year span.168 
President Dwight Eisenhower alone impounded ten weapons systems 
appropriations.169 There is also a history of executive impoundments of 
military personnel, which dates back to Madison and involved four 
presidents.170 President Franklin Roosevelt was the first twentieth 
century president to impound a military personnel appropriation when 
 
 164. Of the sixty-four instances of impoundments identified by the Author of this Note, thirty-
three pertained to national security, twenty-nine of which were weapons system, military 
personnel, and military construction impoundments. See infra app. 
 165. See infra app.  
 166. Although this Note argues for a constitutional impoundment authority, there is 
conceivably also a statutory interpretation argument for presidential impoundment independent 
of the ICA framework. In light of the historical practice, defense spending appropriations may 
implicitly confer some discretion on the executive. Congress can presumably choose to confer 
such discretion, and, if it does, no issue of constitutional impoundment is raised. When taking 
such an impoundment action, the executive could cite to Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 
(1981), which relied heavily on historical practice to find implicit congressional authorization for 
settling of American claims with foreign powers. See id. at 678 (“Such failure of Congress 
specifically to delegate authority does not, ‘especially . . . in the areas of foreign policy and 
national security,’ imply ‘congressional disapproval’ of action taken by the Executive.” (quoting 
Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 291 (1981))). 
 167. Louis Fisher, The Politics of Impounded Funds, 15 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 361, 367–68 (1970) 
[hereinafter The Politics of Impounded Funds].  
 168. See infra app. 
 169. See infra app. 
 170. See infra app. 
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he impounded funding for ROTC units in 1938.171 Finally, there is a 
practice of executive branch impoundment of military construction. 
The first documented impoundment occurred when Jefferson 
impounded the construction of several navy yards in 1801.172 But in the 
twentieth century, Eisenhower alone impounded military construction, 
once in 1960 and again in 1961.173  
B. Three Case Studies Demonstrating Congressional Acquiescence  
The many WPC impoundments spanning decades—and 
sometimes centuries—have prompted rich constitutional discussion. 
The following three examples provide a snapshot of the debate 
between Congress and the president over such impoundments. This 
historical record is relatively robust compared to those that the Court 
reviewed in Noel Canning and Zivotofsky II because the latter 
instances did not include extensive dialogue between the political 
branches or explicit constitutional argumentation by the political 
actors. Though the majority of WPC impoundments did not appear to 
create tension between the political branches, this Note highlights 
three episodes that prompted a reaction from Congress, casting light 
on the dialogue regarding executive branch practice. These episodes 
are useful for gloss analysis because they demonstrate congressional 
acquiescence as well as several presidents’ willingness to compromise. 
Thus, they highlight the coordinate branches’ ability to work through 
WPC impoundment issues without the Court’s intervention.  
In 1949, Truman requested funding sufficient to maintain only a 
forty-eight group Air Force.174 The House, however, passed an 
appropriation calling for a fifty-eight group Air Force.175 The Senate 
sided with the president, creating a standstill.176 The House and 
Truman reached an informal agreement in which Congress granted the 
administration discretion to determine whether to spend the additional 
 
 171. ELIAS HUZAR, THE PURSE AND THE SWORD: CONTROL OF THE ARMY BY CONGRESS 
THROUGH MILITARY APPROPRIATIONS, 1933-1950, at 368 (1950).  
 172. Thomas Jefferson, First Annual Message to Congress (Dec. 8, 1801), in 1 A COMPILATION 
OF THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 1789-1897, at 330 (James D. Richardson ed., 
Washington, Gov’t Printing Off. 1896) [hereinafter 1 MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE 
PRESIDENTS]. 
 173. Id. 
 174. The Politics of Impounded Funds, supra note 167, at 366.  
 175. Id.  
 176. Id. 
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funding.177 The president impounded $735 million, and the funds were 
never spent.178 When questioned about his authority to impound, 
Truman responded, “That is the discretionary power of the President. 
If he doesn’t feel like the money should be spent, I don’t think he can 
be forced to spend it.”179 
Frustrated with Truman’s actions, the House Appropriations 
Committee called Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson in for a 
hearing.180 Johnson defended Truman, stating that his actions were 
based on the “inherent authority vested in the Commander in Chief 
and the President.”181 He clarified that the president can impound “in 
the area above what he thinks are the necessary items for the defense 
or security . . . .”182 The chair of the committee, George H. Mahon, 
appears to ultimately have agreed with Johnson. He stated:  
[O]ver the long span of time . . . weight of experience and practice 
bears out the general proposition that an appropriation does not 
constitute a mandate to spend every dollar appropriated . . . . 
I believe it is fundamentally desirable that the Executive have limited 
powers of impoundment in the interests of good management and 
constructive economy in public expenditures.183  
In earlier congressional sessions, members of Congress signaled 
that they shared Mahon’s perspective. Chairman Elmer Thomas of the 
Senate Subcommittee on Military Appropriations stated, “I do not 
think the money should be used. I think it should be impounded, and 
leave the impression that if the money is appropriated it may not be 
used.”184 Additionally, Senator Robert Taft stated, “The 
Appropriations Committee can reduce [military] funds to what it 
considers a point of safety, but it cannot feel sure about going further. 
 
 177. Id. 
 178. Id. at 366–67. 
 179. Harry S. Truman, The President’s News Conference of September 20, 1950, in PUBLIC 
PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES: HARRY S. TRUMAN, 1950, at 657, 661 
(1979).  
 180. See Department of Defense Appropriations for 1951: Hearings Before the H. Comm. on 
Appropriations, 81st Cong. 42, 50–54 (1950) (statement of Louis Johnson, Secretary of Defense).  
 181. Id. at 55. 
 182. HUZAR, supra note 171. 
 183. Executive Impoundment of Appropriated Funds: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on 
Separation of Powers of the S. Subcomm. on the Judiciary, 92d Cong. 501–02 (1971) [hereinafter 
1971 Hearings] (letter from Rep. George H. Mahon, Chairman, H. Comm. on Appropriations).  
 184. 95 CONG. REC. 14354, 14355 (1949).  
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It might be destroying a department’s effective work. Only the 
department itself can make the additional saving necessary over what 
Congress has done.”185  
President John F. Kennedy’s foray into impoundment was 
perhaps the most visible episode of executive impoundment involving 
weapons systems in the twentieth century. In 1961, OMB requested 
$200 million to procure B-70 strategic bombers.186 Notwithstanding the 
president’s request, Congress appropriated $380 million.187 Kennedy 
impounded the additional $180 million because he believed that the 
DoD’s intercontinental ballistic missile technology reduced the need 
for additional bombers.188  
The chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, Carl 
Vinson, responded fiercely. Vinson drafted language for the next year’s 
appropriation, which stated, “Lest there be any doubt as to what the 
RS-70 amendment means let it be said that it means exactly what it 
says, i.e., that the Secretary of the Air Force, as an official of the 
executive branch, is directed, ordered, mandated, and required to 
utilize the full amount of the $491 million authority granted . . . ‘for an 
RS-70 weapon system.’”189 The Committee Report further stated, “[i]f 
this language constitutes a test as to whether Congress has the power 
to so mandate, let the test be made and let this important weapon 
system be the field of trial.”190  
Kennedy wrote to Vinson, expressing his opinion that the 
mandatory language should be removed based on “the full powers and 
discretions essential to the faithful execution of my responsibilities as 
President and Commander in Chief . . . .”191 Kennedy wrote, “I would 
respectfully suggest that, in place of the word ‘directed,’ the word 
‘authorized’ would be more suitable to an authorizing bill (which is not 
an appropriation of funds) and more clearly in line with the spirit of 
the Constitution.”192 
 
 185. Id. at 12388, 12410.  
 186. The Politics of Impounded Funds, supra note 167, at 369.  
 187. Id. 
 188. Id. 
 189. H.R. REP. NO. 87-1406, at 9 (1962).  
 190. Id. 
 191. 1971 Hearings, supra note 183, at 526 (letter from President John F. Kennedy to Rep. 
Carl Vinson, Chairman, H. Armed Servs. Comm. (Mar. 20, 1962)).  
 192. Id.  
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Kennedy got his way—the full House sided with the president, not 
Vinson.193 Then-Representative Gerald Ford stated that the language 
“invaded the responsibilities and the jurisdiction of . . . the 
President . . . usurped the appropriating authority of the Committee on 
Appropriations . . . [and] created inflexibility in the management of the 
RS–70 program. . . .”194 In a meeting at the White House, Vinson 
agreed to replace the mandatory language with the word 
“authorized.”195 As an olive branch, Kennedy ordered the secretary of 
defense to conduct a study of the RS-70 Program.196 Only two 
prototypes were ever built.197  
The Truman and Kennedy examples demonstrate congressional 
acquiescence. Tension between the political branches provides 
stronger support for a showing of acquiescence than situations that lack 
debate because they reveal that the branches considered and resolved 
the issues. Here, the episodes are particularly useful because the 
president and significant congressional players voiced their 
constitutional views that the president did have authority under the 
commander-in-chief power to impound. Significantly, Congress 
yielded in both situations.  
Although the executive branch prevailed in the two previous 
examples, a dispute during President Lyndon Johnson’s administration 
illustrates that a president might comply with a congressional defense 
appropriation, against his wish to impound, when under sufficient 
congressional pressure. In 1965, the Department of the Navy desired 
an additional nuclear-powered guided missile ship, the DLGN-36.198 
Although the DoD opposed the request, Congress appropriated for the 
 
 193. See id. at 38–39 (“[I]t was clearly a victory for the White House.”).  
 194. 108 CONG. REC. 4687, 4714 (1962). Representative Perkins Bass expressed a similar 
sentiment—through an unconvincing analogy—when he stated, “It is inconceivable to me that 
Congress should tell a Commander in Chief what weapons system to develop any more than it 
should attempt to tell a general in the field which weapons to fire.” Id. at 4719 (statement of Rep. 
Perkins Bass). 
 195. Funds Impounded by the President, supra note 73, at 128–29; John H. Stassen, Separation 
of Powers and the Uncommon Defense: The Case Against Impounding of Weapons Systems 
Appropriations, 57 GEO. L.J. 1159, 1166–67 (1969). 
 196. PFIFFNER, supra note 41, at 38–39. 
 197. Id. at 39. 
 198. Stassen, supra note 195, at 1169, 1173. 
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DLGN-36.199 The DoD, however, refused to release the funds 
necessary to build the DLGN-36 in fiscal year 1966.200 
In response, Congress appropriated for a second nuclear-powered 
guided missile ship, the DLGN-37, and passed appropriation language 
stating that “[t]he contract for the construction of the nuclear powered 
guided missile frigate . . . shall be entered into as soon as practicable 
unless the President fully advises the Congress that its construction is 
not in the national interest.”201 The DoD did subsequently release the 
funds for the DLGN-36—thus deferring, rather than rescinding the 
funds—but it did not release the funds for the DLGN-37.202 The House 
Armed Services Committee, however, was adamant that the funds be 
released, and drafted language preparing to appropriate for a third ship 
in the next fiscal year.203 When it became apparent that another 
committee, the Joint Atomic Energy Committee, was also supportive 
of a third ship, Johnson released the funding for the second ship.204 
The Johnson example demonstrates that the political branches are 
capable of coordinate constitutional construction because of their 
ability to resolve disputes without involving the Supreme Court as a 
referee. Brownell views the Johnson administration’s concession as 
undercutting the President’s impoundment authority.205 Yet modern 
gloss analysis does not require the political branches to be in perpetual, 
total accord to establish gloss.206 In fact, occasional disagreement is a 
feature, not a bug. The WPC impoundment episodes show that the 
president will not inevitably win out over Congress when the 
legislature has a true collective interest in a given appropriation.  
C. Applying Gloss Factors to WPC Impoundments  
This Note adds to impoundment scholarship by applying modern 
gloss analysis to constitutional provisions relevant to executive 
 
 199. Id. at 1169–70.  
 200. Id. at 1170. 
 201. Id. at 1171 (emphasis omitted).  
 202. Id. at 1173.  
 203. Id. at 1170.  
 204. Id. at 1174. 
 205. Brownell, supra note 54, at 46. Brownell seems to argue that the more instances of 
unchallenged impoundment, and the more “continuous” the use, the stronger the president’s 
claim. Id. at 59.  
 206. See Bradley & Siegel, supra note 93, at 22–31 (describing how the justifications for 
historical gloss do not require interbranch agreement). 
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impoundments, specifically, to WPC impoundments. This Section will 
show that the first three gloss factors—deference to nonjudicial actors, 
limits on judicial capacity, and consequentialist concerns—support 
using longstanding executive branch practice to gloss the meaning of 
the Appropriations and Commander-in-Chief Clauses to recognize the 
legitimacy of WPC impoundments.  
To begin, the “deference to nonjudicial actors” factor is supported 
by a robust record of constitutional exchange between the president 
and Congress regarding WPC impoundments. The Court “do[es] not 
have a monopoly on constitutional interpretation,”207 and, as to 
impoundments involving weapons systems and military personnel in 
particular, the political branches have exchanged their views and 
seemingly agreed to permit presidential flexibility to impound such 
appropriations. 
Second, in terms of “limits on judicial capacity,” courts lack useful 
tools to ascribe meaning to the Appropriations and Commander-in-
Chief Clauses. Neither the text of the Constitution nor founding era 
records clarify the extent of the president’s role as commander-in-
chief, or whether the Appropriations Clause imposes a spending floor 
on the executive branch. Well-established executive branch practice 
and congressional acquiescence have brought the clauses together 
within the limited scope of WPC impoundments, so there is a 
particularly strong argument to allow gloss to infuse meaning into these 
constitutional provisions.  
Of all the factors, the third factor, “consequentialism,” most 
supports glossing the clauses to permit WPC impoundments, as the 
president occupies a superior vantage point to Congress for reducing 
wasteful defense spending.208 The consequentialist rationale for 
retaining a qualified executive impoundment power is bolstered by the 
sheer magnitude of U.S. defense spending. The DoD budget supports 
U.S. defense objectives, such as limiting the spread of nuclear weapons, 
protecting air and maritime space for trade and travel, deterring the 
rise of global powers that might disrupt a stable international order, 
and preventing small conflicts from escalating into regional wars.209 
 
 207. Doing Gloss, supra note 110, at 64.  
 208. See supra Part I. 
 209. Michael O’Hanlon, U.S. Defense Strategy and the Defense Budget, BROOKINGS INST. 1, 
3 (2016) [hereinafter O’Hanlon, U.S. Defense Strategy], https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/
uploads/2016/07/OHanlon_FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/8L5B-W4L4].  
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Even so, the defense budget is of such a scale that defense stalwarts 
and government analysts acknowledge excessive DoD spending, 
including unneeded military facilities,210 exponential cost overruns (the 
F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, for example),211 outmoded weapons 
systems,212 and duplicative investments across the military services.213 
Additionally, out of fear that Congress would appropriate less in the 
future if the Department fails to spend its entire appropriation, DoD 
engages in “use-it or lose-it” spending sprees at the end of the fiscal 
year.214 
Defense Secretary Robert Gates notably called for reducing the 
defense budget in 2010.215 That year, on the sixty-fifth anniversary of 
Victory in Europe Day, Gates noted that since the terror attacks on 
9/11, the DoD budget had nearly doubled. He vowed that “military 
spending on things large and small can and should expect 
closer, harsher scrutiny.”216 Yet despite Gates’s efforts, the defense 
budget’s top line remained roughly the same for the next five years.217 
Therefore, executive impoundment provides the president with a 
valuable tool to curtail wasteful defense spending. Moreover, for 
several reasons, the president is better positioned than Congress to 
 
 210. Christopher Preble, The Right Way To Cut Wasteful Defense Spending, POLITICO (Jan. 
18, 2017), https://www.politico.com/agenda/story/2017/01/the-right-way-to-cut-wasteful-defense-
spending-000282 [https://perma.cc/S5ZK-UMBF]. 
 211. DEP’T OF DEF., COMPREHENSIVE SELECTED ACQUISITION REPORTS 
FOR THE ANNUAL 2018 REPORTING REQUIREMENT AS UPDATED BY THE PRESIDENT’S FISCAL YEAR 
2020 BUDGET 5–6 (2019), https://media.defense.gov/2019/Aug/01/2002165676/-1/-1/1/DEPARTMENT-
OF-DEFENSE-SELECTED-ACQUISITION-REPORTS-(SARS)-DECEMBER-2018.PDF [https://
perma.cc/NV7B-DNK9].  
 212. Leo Blanken, Jason Lepore & Stephen Rodriguez, America’s Military Is Choking on Old 
Technology, FOREIGN POL’Y (Jan. 29, 2018, 3:01 PM), https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/01/29/
americas-military-is-choking-on-old-technology/# [https://perma.cc/7EGR-LT3B]. 
 213. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-15-466, WEAPONS SYSTEMS ACQUISITIONS 
1 (2015), https://www.gao.gov/assets/680/672205.pdf [https://perma.cc/4VGD-A89P]. 
 214. Kyle Rempfer, Use-it or Lose-it: DoD Dropped $4.6 Million on Crab and Lobster, and 




 215. Press Release, Dep’t of Def., Gates Calls for Significant Cuts in Defense Overhead (May 
8, 2010), https://archive.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=59082k [https://perma.cc/Q5BJ-
DQ6V].  
 216. Id. 
 217. Michael E. O’Hanlon, How, and Where, To Cut Defense Spending, BROOKINGS INST. 
(May 19, 2011), https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/how-and-where-to-cut-defense-spending/
amp/ [https://perma.cc/4DFM-93BT].  
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make spending cuts. First, the president’s larger staff and greater access 
to intelligence allows him to adjust to changing financial and security 
circumstances. Second, the Pentagon routinely underestimates costs 
for weapons systems and military construction, and frequently 
encounters design flaws that prevent execution, potentially rendering 
appropriations impractical.218 And third, Congress, as an institution, 
may not actually wish to spend on certain military projects. Rather, 
lobbying exerts an undue influence on the congressional budget 
process.219 By contrast, special interests exert a relatively weak 
influence on OMB.220  
Although consequentialist analysis highlights the potential for 
immense budgetary savings, a limited WPC impoundment power 
would not give the president unbounded influence over Congress. 
Lengthy history has established only three narrow areas within the 
broad zone of national security spending: appropriations for weapons 
systems, uniformed military personnel, and military construction. 
Recognizing executive impoundment in these discrete fields would not 
lead to the kind of amorphous national security impoundment in which 
Roosevelt engaged. 
Additionally, a president would not likely take the decision to 
impound lightly.221 One former senior OMB national security official 
interviewed for this Note emphasized that he would only recommend 
that a president impound if the spending was of great magnitude, truly 
wasteful, and if DoD endorsed the measure.222 He further stated that 
the Pentagon would not unnecessarily provoke Congress.223 Another 
OMB official clarified this last point: 
 
 218. O’Hanlon, U.S. Defense Strategy, supra note 209, at 5.  
 219. In a telephone interview, one OMB national security official stated:  
The lobbying associated with the military industrial complex is very robust. The 
professional staff in Congress is closer to that lobbying and more susceptible to it. A 
lobbyist calls and says “put money in this appropriation”–it’s an endless stream. The 
OMB budget process on the other hand, as dysfunctional as it seems, is as close to 
analytical rigor as you can get. 
Telephone Interview with OMB National Security Official #1 (Jan. 4, 2020) (on file with author) 
[hereinafter OMB Interview 1].  
 220. See Pasachoff, supra note 6, at 2286–87 (“OMB budget review is an insider’s game. There 
is a small group of D.C. lobbyists with specialties in OMB . . . .”).  
 221. This, of course, presumes a rational actor being advised by other rational actors. 
 222. Telephone Interview with OMB National Security Official #2 (Oct. 27, 2019) (on file 
with author) [hereinafter OMB Interview 2]. 
 223. Id.  
BALE IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 11/16/2020  7:38 PM 
2020 CHECKING THE PURSE 645 
When you talk to budget officers within DoD, when you talk to 
congressional liaisons, they speak about Congress in personal terms. 
They refer to a particular professional staff member, who is very 
powerful, and how that person will respond to a decision. It distills 
down, not necessarily to DoD as a whole not wanting to provoke 
Congress, but rather, individuals within one institution not wanting to 
upset individuals in the other institution.224 
Furthermore, of the three OMB officials interviewed for this Note, 
all stated that they would favor “reprogramming” wasteful 
appropriations, if legally possible, before impounding them.225 
Although appropriations are usually detailed and specify spending 
items, the Supreme Court has held that agencies may shift funds from 
one purpose to another within the same appropriation, absent a 
statutory prohibition.226 Given the breadth of items within a single 
appropriation, reprogramming creates flexibility. In contrast, an 
agency may generally not “transfer” funds—that is, shift funds from 
one appropriation to another.227 Thus, while theoretically a powerful 
tool for checking wasteful defense spending, the use of executive 
impoundment would be tempered by a desire for DoD input, good 
relations with Congress, and a preference not to lose budget authority 
that could be shifted within an appropriation. Accordingly, recognizing 
 
 224. OMB Interview 1, supra note 219 (emphasis added). A third OMB official agreed that 
OMB would consult closely with DoD. Telephone Interview with OMB National Security Official 
#3 (Dec. 31, 2019) (on file with author) [hereinafter OMB Interview 3]. 
 225. OMB Interview 1, supra note 219; OMB Interview 2, supra note 222; OMB Interview 3, 
supra note 224. 
 226. See Lincoln v. Vigil, 508 U.S. 182, 183 (1993) (“It is a fundamental principle of 
appropriations law that where Congress merely appropriates lump-sum amounts without 
statutory restriction . . . indicia in committee reports and other legislative history . . . do not 
establish any legal requirements on the agency.”). 
 227. See 31 U.S.C. § 1532 (2018) (“An amount available under law may be withdrawn from 
one appropriation account and credited to another or to a working fund only when authorized by 
law.”). The distinction between a reprogramming and a transfer can be subtle. The Congressional 
Research Service provides the following example:  
[I]n FY2013 there were more than 30 accounts within the Department of Justice 
Appropriations Act, including an account for “Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), 
Salaries and Expenses” and an account for “Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, 
and Explosives (ATF), Salaries and Expenses.”
 
Given the range of activities typically 
funded by these two accounts, a transfer would occur if funds originally appropriated 
for FBI salaries and expenses were moved and then used to pay for ATF salaries and 
expenses. 
CONG. RSCH. SERV., R43098, TRANSFER AND REPROGRAMMING OF APPROPRIATIONS: AN 
OVERVIEW OF AUTHORITIES, LIMITATIONS, AND PROCEDURES 1 (2013); see also infra notes 
253–68 and accompanying text. 
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a constitutional impoundment power in the national security context is 
not likely to greatly alter the budget-making relationship between 
Congress and the president. 
D. Avoiding “Counter-Gloss”: Disrupted Historical Practice  
The final hurdle for establishing gloss-based WPC impoundments 
is also a potentially novel question in legal scholarship involving gloss: 
How does one treat Supreme Court intervention that chills custom? 
Although the Train Court did not address the constitutionality of 
executive impoundment, the Supreme Court would not have ordered 
the executive to disburse the appropriation had the Court recognized 
the president as possessing an unlimited, inherent constitutional 
authority to impound. The Train decision, however, should not be 
construed as creating a “counter-gloss” ending the impoundment 
power. Train can be read as not covering all executive impoundment, 
since it only addressed a domestic appropriation. Moreover, from a 
normative standpoint, judicial intrusions are not always welcome in 
separation of powers disputes because they can disrupt the healthy 
development of custom that evolves through repeated interactions 
between the political branches.228 The best way to explain the dearth of 
executive impoundment over the forty-five years since Train is that the 
decision has had too great an influence on the interaction between the 
two political branches.  
In fact, Congress attempted to restore a functional equivalent of 
executive impoundment by enacting the Line Item Veto Act.229 This 
 
 228. This iterative approach to developing constitutional law is in contrast to the Court’s 
practice of stare decisis, which freezes the development of constitutional law and leads to path 
dependency. See Bradley & Siegel, supra note 93, at 11 (“[T]he counter-majoritarian difficulty is 
especially acute when courts seek to overturn longstanding practices accepted and relied upon by 
both coordinate branches of the government, which may justify particular judicial deference to 
such practices in constitutional interpretation.”).  
 229. The law allowed the president to cancel what he deemed wasteful tax and spending 
provisions within five days of presentment. See Line Item Veto Act, Pub. L. No. 104-130, § 2, 110 
Stat. 1200, 1200 (1996), invalidated by Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998). The Line 
Item Veto Act was signed into law on April 9, 1996, and amended Title X of the Congressional 
Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974. Id. The act attempted to accomplish a similar 
goal to executive impoundment: members of Congress have an incentive to create wasteful 
defense programs for their districts, so it is functionally desirable for presidents to be able to 
decide not to spend the money, despite a statutory mandate. The act is distinguishable from 
executive impoundment in at least three ways. First, there is no temporal limitation on when the 
president can impound. Second, the act purported to cover all spending provisions—as well as tax 
provisions—deemed wasteful by the president. Id. By contrast, this Note argues that executive 
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suggests that Congress recognizes that it has difficulty checking its own 
power of the purse and would like to return some form of executive 
impoundment to the president. The takeaway is that Train does not 
signify a settlement between the executive and legislative branches on 
the issue of executive impoundment. The intervention of the Supreme 
Court chilled executive branch practice, but the Court avoided the 
constitutional question.  
IV.  THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF FOUR POST-ICA EXECUTIVE 
ACTIONS 
The above analysis points to a limited impoundment domain that 
survives the ICA and Train. First, statutory impoundment—a weak 
mechanism for checking the purse—is explicitly authorized under the 
ICA. Second, Zivotofsky II recognizes executive impoundment in the 
discrete areas of exclusive executive authority. And perhaps most 
significantly, glossing the Appropriations and Commander-in-Chief 
Clauses in the context of congressional defense spending supports 
executive impoundment authority for WPC appropriations. This Part 
applies this Note’s impoundment framework to four relatively recent 
examples of presidents engaging in impoundment-related activities 
and assesses the constitutionality of each action.  
As a first example, the George H.W. Bush administration 
canceled a weapon system without congressional approval.230 In that 
instance, DoD ended production of the Navy’s A-12 Stealth aircraft.231 
Defense Secretary Dick Cheney announced that DoD cancelled the 
$57 billion program because the builders failed to “design, develop, 
fabricate, assemble and test the A-12 aircraft within the contract 
 
impoundment is limited by the relevant historical practice. And third, executive impoundment 
derives from the president’s constitutional—rather than statutory—authority. That is not to say 
that the two concepts do not overlap. In fact, Brownell has argued that the Clinton administration 
made a “grave error” in how it employed the Line Item Veto Act. See Brownell, Comment, supra 
note 74, at 1276–77 (arguing that the administration should have only cancelled provisions 
relating to national security “because that is where the President’s constitutional authority is 
greatest. In so doing, the Administration would have ensured that the inevitable constitutional 
challenge would have been brought on the terms most favorable to the Executive branch.” 
(footnote omitted)). 
 230. Eric Schmitt, Pentagon Scraps $57 Billion Order for Attack Plane, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 8, 
1991), https://www.nytimes.com/1991/01/08/us/pentagon-scraps-57-billion-order-for-attack-plane.html 
[https://perma.cc/J46J-TPBR]. 
 231. Id. 
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schedule.”232 In language that echoed Nixon, Cheney stated, “If we 
cannot spend the taxpayers’ money wisely, we will not spend it.”233 
Unlike Nixon’s impoundments, however, this impoundment was 
constitutional under the WPC impoundment framework. Despite 
contravening the ICA, the impoundment was of a weapons system, an 
area that this Note asserts is within the president’s impoundment 
authority. 
President George W. Bush also engaged in a form of 
impoundment, though his action was likely unconstitutional under the 
WPC framework. In October 2005, OMB sent a letter to Congress 
proposing cancellation of budget authority but specifically noted that 
the proposal was not a “special message” rescission proposal pursuant 
to the ICA.234 Notwithstanding inaction from Congress, seven agencies 
withheld budget authority from twelve domestic policy programs.235 
The Government Accountability Office (“GAO”) subsequently found 
that the agencies had violated the ICA.236 These impoundments were 
likely unconstitutional because they fell outside the WPC framework 
and did not pertain to exclusive areas of presidential authority. This 
example also illustrates how presidential action can still be monitored 
even if one endorses the WPC impoundment framework. GAO is 
authorized to bring suit to compel spending when the executive branch 
violates the ICA.237 Accordingly, if an impoundment falls outside the 
scope of WPC appropriation or another area pertaining to exclusive 
presidential power, the GAO could sue OMB.238  
A third example of impoundment involves the Trump 
administration’s withholding of $391 million in military assistance to 
 
 232. Id. 
 233. Id. 
 234. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-10-320T, IMPOUNDMENT CONTROL ACT: 
USE AND IMPACT OF RESCISSION PROCEDURES 4–5 (2009) [hereinafter USE AND IMPACT OF 
RESCISSION PROCEDURES], https://www.gao.gov/assets/130/123935.pdf [https://perma.cc/26AL-
E99A]. 
 235. Id. at 4.  
 236. Id. at 5.  
 237. 2 U.S.C. § 687 (2018).  
 238. Id. It appears, however, that the GAO rarely proactively monitors the executive branch 
for violations of the ICA. This raises the question as to whether executive branch agencies de 
facto impound by failing to spend all appropriated dollars. See USE AND IMPACT OF RESCISSION 
PROCEDURES, supra note 234, at 1–2. 
BALE IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 11/16/2020  7:38 PM 
2020 CHECKING THE PURSE 649 
the Ukraine.239 In that instance, the assistant director of OMB for 
National Security (a political appointee), acting on orders from the 
West Wing, withdrew the apportionment authority from the career 
staff and subsequently directed the Pentagon to delay disbursing the 
aid.240 In addition to corresponding with senior Pentagon officials, the 
appointee attached a footnote to the OMB apportionment that 
specified that the funding was to be temporarily withheld.241 In 
testimony before the House Impeachment Committee, the chief career 
OMB national security official, Mark Sandy, stated that he was 
concerned that the hold would violate the ICA.242 The freeze was lifted 
on September 9, 2019, a few weeks shy of the September 30 fiscal year 
deadline.243 Sandy was correct that delaying the funds beyond the end 
of the fiscal year would violate the ICA, constituting unauthorized 
statutory impoundment.  
Moreover, such a delay would also represent unauthorized 
executive impoundment and thus would likely be unconstitutional 
notwithstanding OMB’s argument to the contrary. In a letter to the 
GAO, OMB—as it had under past presidents—asserted a Take Care 
Clause rationale to defend its withholding.244 The memo stated that:  
The President of the United States is required to “take Care that the 
Laws be faithfully executed.” U.S. Const. Art. II, Sec. 3. As part of 
carrying out this duty, the Executive branch must ensure that Federal 
agencies spend appropriated funds in an efficient and effective 
manner, consistent with the purpose for which the funds were 
appropriated.245 
Further along, the memo stated, “In other words, it is inherent to 
OMB’s apportionment authority that not all appropriated funds must 
be immediately available for obligation. Pauses in obligational 
 
 239. Eric Lipton, Maggie Haberman & Mark Mazzetti, Behind the Ukraine Aid Freeze: 84 
Days of Conflict and Confusion, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 29, 2019) [hereinafter Behind the Ukraine Aid 
Freeze], https://nyti.ms/39qrLdQ [https://perma.cc/UE6J-DHSP].  
 240. Id. 
 241. Id. 
 242. Id. 
 243. Id. 
 244. Letter from Mark R. Paoletta, Gen. Couns., Off. of Mgmt. & Budget, to Tom Armstrong, 
Gen. Couns., Gov’t Accountability Off., 3 (Dec. 11, 2019), https://context-cdn.
washingtonpost.com/notes/prod/default/documents/5dbd9f69-2537-4272-bd5d-60c94d3843b6/note/ 
112b1caa-763c-4c4c-a5bb-0a04f7962d2c.pdf [https://perma.cc/P75G-45HV]. 
 245. Id.  
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authority are necessary for proper stewardship of taxpayer funds.”246 
Thus, “OMB took appropriate action, in light of a pending policy 
process, to ensure that funds were not obligated prematurely in a 
manner that could conflict with the President’s foreign policy.”247 
Pursuant to its ICA authority, the GAO issued a decision 
condemning OMB’s impoundment.248 In its nine-page opinion, the 
GAO straightforwardly assessed OMB’s conduct under the ICA, 
rejecting the explanation that the hold was necessary to avoid a conflict 
with the president’s foreign policy.249 The GAO’s constitutional 
analysis, however, was somewhat conclusory. The decision stated in 
part that “[t]he Constitution grants the President no unilateral 
authority to withhold funds from obligation,”250 “[a]n appropriations 
act is a law like any other,”251 and “once [an appropriations law is] 
enacted, the President must ‘take care that the laws be faithfully 
executed.’”252 The opinion neglected to reference Train, let alone 
account for centuries of historical practice.  
Despite a lack of thorough constitutional treatment, the GAO’s 
conclusion was likely correct, at least according to this Note’s 
framework. The hold on aid neither fell within an area of exclusive 
presidential authority, nor constituted a WPC impoundment. 
Although the president may be the nation’s chief diplomat, his 
exclusive powers are limited to the recognition power, leading treaty 
negotiations, and maintaining secrets related to treaty making. 
Withholding military aid duly appropriated by Congress falls outside 
the impoundment power incidental to the president’s role as chief 
diplomat.  
Finally, the WPC framework is helpful for assessing the 
constitutionality of Trump’s attempt to divert defense spending to 
build a wall between the United States and Mexico. In February 2019—
shortly after Trump declared a national emergency at the southern 
border under the National Emergencies Act—the Department of 
 
 246. Id. at 4. 
 247. Id. at 9. 
 248. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., B-331564, MATTER OF OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT 
AND BUDGET—WITHHOLDING OF UKRAINE SECURITY ASSISTANCE 4–8 (2020), https://
www.gao.gov/assets/710/703909.pdf [https://perma.cc/M9BS-AZ95]. 
 249. Id. at 6. 
 250. Id. at 5. 
 251. Id. 
 252. Id. at 6 (quoting U.S. CONST., art. II, § 3).  
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Homeland Security submitted a funding request to DoD.253 According 
to the administration, the requested funds were for “replacing existing 
pedestrian fencing or vehicle barriers that had proven to be ineffective 
with 30-foot-high steel bollard fencing.”254 
Acting Secretary of Defense Patrick Shanahan approved the 
request, invoking his authority under § 8005 of the 2019 National 
Defense Appropriations Act to transfer funds between DoD 
appropriations.255 Section 8005 authorizes the secretary of defense, 
“[u]pon determination . . . that such action is necessary in the national 
interest,” to transfer up to $4 billion between DoD appropriations.256 
The provision additionally requires that the transfer be “for higher 
priority items, based on unforeseen military requirements,” and “in no 
case where the item for which funds are requested has been denied by 
the Congress.”257 Shanahan executed two transfers totaling $2.5 billion, 
shifting the money to the DoD “Drug Interdiction and Counter-Drug 
Activities” appropriation.258 
In June 2020, the Ninth Circuit held that the acting secretary 
exceeded his statutory authority under § 8005 and that “[a]bsent such 
statutory authority, the Executive Branch lacked independent 
constitutional authority to transfer the funds at issue here.”259 In 
October 2020, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to hear the case.260 
The issue pending before the Court is whether the acting secretary of 
defense exceeded his statutory authority in making the transfers—a 
question of statutory interpretation beyond the scope of this Note.261  
The case, however, necessarily raises an important constitutional 
question which the Court could possibly answer. Though not the 
approach taken by the Ninth Circuit, one way of analyzing the 
transfer’s legality is by deconstructing it into its component parts. A 
 
 253. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 7, Trump v. Sierra Club, No.  20-138 (Aug. 2020), 2020 
WL 4586169.  
 254. Id. 
 255. Id. at 7–8. 
 256. Department of Defense Appropriations Act of 2019, Pub. L. No. 115-245, div. A, tit. 
VIII, 132 Stat. 2999. 
 257. Id. 
 258. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 253, at 8. 
 259. California v. Trump, 963 F.3d 926, 949 (9th Cir. 2020), cert. granted sub nom Trump v. 
Sierra Club, No. 20-138, 2020 WL 6121565 (U.S. Oct. 19, 2020). 
 260. Sierra Club, 2020 WL 6121565 at *1. 
 261. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 253, at I.  
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transfer untethered from a statute involves both an executive 
impoundment of one account and a reappropriation of the impounded 
funds into a second account. Thus, whether or not the administration 
explicitly claimed constitutional authority to execute the transfer, the 
first step of such a transfer action raises a constitutional question 
because it implicates the president’s independent impoundment 
authority. In other words, if the president exceeded his statutory 
authority under § 8005, he unilaterally impounded funds.  
In order to assess the legality of such an action, the first question 
is whether the step one impoundment action was constitutional. In the 
first transfer, the acting secretary withdrew $993,627,000 from the 
“Military Personnel, Army” appropriation and $6,373,000 from the 
“Reserve Personnel, Army” appropriation.262 In the second transfer, 
he withdrew $604,000,000 from the “Afghanistan Security Forces 
Fund” appropriation, $77,535,000 from the “Operation and 
Maintenance, Defense-Wide” appropriation, and $818,465,000 from 12 
other DoD appropriations.263 At first blush, it appears that the 
administration satisfied the initial inquiry under this Note’s WPC 
framework by restricting its impoundment to what it describes as 
“personnel accounts.”264 The actual details of those appropriations 
prove otherwise.  
The cancellation of “Military Personnel, Army” and “Reserve 
Personnel, Army” funds appear to be WPC impoundments because 
they are labeled as personnel appropriations. Yet those appropriations 
fund more than basic pay, also covering retirement pay, matching 
savings contributions, housing allowances, educational programming, 
and incentives programs, among other things.265 Given that the two 
appropriations fund far more than the number of uniformed troops, for 
them to qualify as WPC impoundments the administration must 
demarcate the withdrawn money as coming directly from personnel 
costs and ensure that the other items remain funded.  
The other two appropriations also fall squarely outside of the 
WPC framework. The “Afghanistan Security Forces Fund” does not 
 
 262. California v. Trump, 963 F.3d at 951. 
 263. Id. at 951–52. 
 264. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 253, at 8. 
 265. H.R. REP. NO. 115-952, at 162–163 (2018) (Conf. Rep.); Petition for Writ of Certiorari, 
supra note 253, at 5 (noting that “legislators . . . commonly use committee reports to memorialize 
their expectations about how appropriated funds will be used for particular items in DoD’s 
budget”). 
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fund U.S. troops, but rather is money made available to the “security 
forces of Afghanistan” for “equipment, supplies, services, training, 
facility and infrastructure repair, renovation, construction, and 
funding.”266 The appropriation is thus a form of foreign aid rather than 
a funding vehicle for defense personnel. Finally, the “Operation and 
Maintenance, Defense” fund does not relate to personnel 
appropriations at all. Operations and maintenance appropriations fund 
the “[c]ost of ground, sea, and air operations, equipment repair, and 
maintenance of defense facilities, healthcare costs, and 
administration.”267 
Simply put, longstanding executive branch practice does not 
support the administration’s transfers to fund the border wall. Even if 
the administration impounded only personnel appropriations, the 
transfer includes not only an impoundment, but also a reappropriation. 
Thus, step two of the legality inquiry requires the president to point to 
an authority that allows him to repurpose the impounded funds. If § 
8005 does not provide that mechanism, the president must identify 
another statute granting him the authority. Otherwise, the president’s 
conduct was unconstitutional because the Appropriations Clause 
prevents the president from originating spending on his own.268  
CONCLUSION 
Although the president may no longer employ executive 
impoundment for domestic policy appropriations in the wake of the 
ICA and Train, he retains narrow independent authority to impound 
in discrete areas of foreign affairs, based on his exclusive authority in 
substantive areas of policy and as shaped through the political 
branches’ coordinate construction of the Constitution’s 
Appropriations and Commander-in-Chief Clauses. Train may have 
chilled the political branches’ coordinate construction of the 
Constitution in regard to executive impoundment, but the issue is not 
settled. Rather, rich historical practice, repeated congressional 
acquiescence, and myriad functional justifications point toward the 
existence of a limited form of executive impoundment. 
  
 
 266. H.R. REP. NO. 115-952, at 56–57. 
 267. CONG. RSCH. SERV., DEFENSE PRIMER: THE NATIONAL DEFENSE BUDGET FUNCTION 
2 (2017).  
 268. See supra notes 29–41 and accompanying text.  
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APPENDIX  
To date, there is no catalog of executive impoundments, though 
Professor Louis Fisher has identified many impoundments in his 
numerous works on the subject. This Appendix begins to create that 
catalog by listing all documented instances of impoundments known to 
the Author at the time of publication. An asterisk appears next to each 
WPC impoundment. This catalog is by no means exhaustive, but the 
continued digitalization of presidential records and newspaper articles 
should faciliate future research to complete this record.  
 
Year  President Impoundment 
1801 Thomas Jefferson *Several navy yards269 
1802 Thomas Jefferson *Gunboats270 
1809 James Madison *Reduction of gunboat crews271 
1838 Andrew Jackson  Contract claim for mail delivery services272 
1840 Martin Van Buren Refusal to pay widow’s claim under Navy pension fund273 
1860 James Buchanan Post offices and other public buildings274 
1876 Ulysses S. Grant  River and harbor improvements275 
1916 Woodrow Wilson Mediation and arbitration to end World War I276 
1921 Warren G. Harding 
Issued a Bureau of the Budget circular treating all 
appropriations as ceilings and requiring each executive 
deparment to determine the portion of its appropriation 
deemed essential for carrying out its mission277 
1931 Herbert Hoover 
Achieved a ten percent cut in government expenditures 
during the Great Depression by ordering administrators to 
create a budget reserve278 
 
 269. 1 MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS, supra note 172.  
 270. PRESIDENTIAL SPENDING POWER, supra note 15, at 150. 
 271. Madison Letter, supra note 141. 
 272. Kendall v. United States ex rel. Stokes, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 524, 527 (1838). 
 273. Decatur v. Paulding, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 497, 498–99 (1840). 
 274. THE CONSTITUTION BETWEEN FRIENDS, supra note 51, at 91. 
 275. Harvard Note, supra note 53, at 1510.  
 276. 39 Stat. 618 (1916).  
 277. The Politics of Impounded Funds, supra note 167, at 362. 
 278. Harvard Note, supra note 53, at 1510–11. 
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1938 Franklin Roosevelt *Reserve Officers’ Training Corps units279 
1940–1943 Franklin Roosevelt Various public works projects280 
1946 Harry Truman The Kings River Project in California’s Central Valley 
Basin281 
1946–1947 Harry Truman *Half of the National Guard’s appropriation282  
1949 Harry Truman *Air Force-related spending283 
1949 Harry Truman *Ten Air Force groups above the president’s request284  
1949 Harry Truman *Aircraft carrier USS United States285 
1949 Harry Truman *Aircraft carrier USS Forrestal286 
1950 Harry Truman Deferring civil programs that did not contribute to the 
Korean War effort287 
1956 Dwight Eisenhower *Marine Corps personnel288 
1956 Dwight Eisenhower *20 superfort bombers289 
1958 Dwight Eisenhower *Army Nike-Zeus antimissile system290 
1959 Dwight Eisenhower *Army modernization291 
1959 Dwight Eisenhower *Regulus submarines292 
1959  Dwight Eisenhower *Hound Dog missile program293 
1959 Dwight Eisenhower *Minuteman program294 
1959 Dwight Eisenhower *KC-135 tankers295 
 
 279. HUZAR, supra note 171. 
 280. PFIFFNER, supra note 41, at 33; The Politics of Impounded Funds, supra note 167, at 364. 
 281. Louis Fisher, Impoundment of Funds: Uses and Abuses, 23 BUFF. L. REV. 141, 165–66 
(1973) [hereinafter Uses and Abuses]. 
 282. HUZAR, supra note 171, at 276. 
 283. The Politics of Impounded Funds, supra note 167, at 366. 
 284. Id.  
 285. Id. at 367. 
 286. National Military Establishment Bill for 1950: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on 
Appropriations,  81st Cong. 328 (1949).  
 287. Id. at 370. 
 288. 1971 Hearings, supra note 183, at 301. 
 289. Impoundment Hearings, supra note 4, at 98. 
 290. The Politics of Impounded Funds, supra note 167, at 368–69. 
 291. 1971 Hearings, supra note 183, at 301. 
 292. Id. 
 293. Id. 
 294. Id. 
 295. Id. 
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1959 Dwight Eisenhower *Strategic airlift aircraft296 
1960 Dwight Eisenhower *Marine Corps personnel strength297 
1960 Dwight Eisenhower *Advance procurement for nuclear-powered carrier298 
1960 Dwight Eisenhower *National Guard construction299 
1960 Dwight Eisenhower *Aircraft for air defense300  
1961 Dwight Eisenhower *Army reserve construction301 
1961 John F. Kennedy *B-70 Strategic Bomber302 
1965 Lyndon Johnson Small watershed projects303 
1965–1966 Lyndon Johnson *DLGN-36 (nuclear-powered guided missile ship)304 
1966 Lyndon Johnson Agriculture appropriation305 
1966 Lyndon Johnson Highway trust fund appropriation306 
1966 Lyndon Johnson Low-cost housing funding307 
1966 Lyndon Johnson Appropriation for the Department of Health, Education, 
and Welfare308 
1966 Lyndon Johnson Education funds for the Elementary and Secondary 
Education Act309 
1966 Lyndon Johnson Construction of a national aquarium310 
1967 Lyndon Johnson Federal aid to highway construction projects311 
1968 Richard Nixon Contract authority issued to the Federal-aid Highway 
Program312 
 
 296. Id. 
 297. Id. 
 298. Id. 
 299. Id. 
 300. Id. 
 301. Id. 
 302. The Politics of Impounded Funds, supra note 167, at 369. 
 303. Uses and Abuses, supra note 281, at 166. 
 304. Stassen, supra note 195; The Politics of Impounded Funds, supra note 167, at 369. 
 305. The Politics of Impounded Funds, supra note 167, at 371. 
 306. Id. 
 307. Id. 
 308. Id. 
 309. Id. 
 310. Uses and Abuses, supra note 281, at 166. 
 311. Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1956—Power of the President to Impound Funds, 42 Op. 
Att’y Gen. 350 (1967). 
 312. Harvard Note, supra note 53, at 1511. 
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1969 Richard Nixon Directed all departments and agencies to reduce spending 
by $3.5 billion to stay within his budget target313 
1971 Richard Nixon Highway funding314 
1971 Richard Nixon Urban community development programs315 
1971 Richard Nixon Funds for a federal drug rehabilitation program316 
1971 Richard Nixon Funds to complete the Cross-Florida Barge Canal317 
1972 Richard Nixon Grants for water treatment systems318  
1972 Richard Nixon Water Bank Program319 
1972 Richard Nixon Farmers Home Administration Emergency Disaster Loan 
Program320 
1972 Richard Nixon Funds to help states control water pollution321 
1973 Richard Nixon Rural Environmental Assistance Program322 
1973 Richard Nixon Low-rent public housing construction subsidies323 
1973 Richard Nixon Model cities and urban renewal programs324 
1973 Richard Nixon Funds to support the Indian Education Act325 
1977 Jimmy Carter *B-1 Bomber326 
1978 Jimmy Carter *Minuteman III missile program327 
1989  George H.W. Bush *Navy V-22 Osprey helicopter328 
 
 313. The Politics of Impounded Funds, supra note 167, at 372. 
 314. Uses and Abuses, supra note 281, at 169. 
 315. Id. at 186. 
 316. Id. at 146. 
 317. Stanton, supra note 46, at 2 n.9. 
 318. Id. at 2 n.4. 
 319. Uses and Abuses, supra note 281, at 171. 
 320. Id. 
 321. Train v. City of New York, 420 U.S. 35, 41–49 (1975). 
 322. Harvard Note, supra note 53, at 1512. 
 323. Id.  
 324. Id. 
 325. Stanton, supra note 46, at 2 n.9. 
 326. Louis Fisher, Effect of the Budget Act of 1974 on Agency Operations, in THE 
CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET PROCESS AFTER FIVE YEARS 154 (Rudolph G. Penner ed., Am. 
Enter. Inst. 1981). 
 327. Id.  
 328. WILLIAM C. BANKS & PETER RAVEN-HANSEN, NATIONAL SECURITY SPENDING AND 
THE CONSTITUTION 84 (1994). 
BALE IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 11/16/2020  7:38 PM 
658  DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 70:607 
1991 George H.W. Bush *Navy A-12 Stealth aircraft329  
2005 George W. Bush Cancellation of budget authority for twelve domestic 
programs330 
2019 Donald Trump Military assistance to Ukraine331 
2019 Donald Trump Funding from various defense appropriation accounts 




 329. Schmitt, supra note 230. 
 330. USE AND IMPACT OF RESCISSION PROCEDURES, supra note 234. 
 331. Behind the Ukraine Aid Freeze, supra note 239. 
 332. Supra notes 253–68 and accompanying text. 
